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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

TECH-FLUID SERVICES, INC.,

:
.MP 11

Plaintiff/Appellant,

o

:

vs.

:

Case No. 880090

GAVILAN OPERATING INCORPORATED, :
PAUITE OIL & MINING CORP.,
et al.
:
Defendants/Respondents. :

Category No. 14b

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
This

Court

has

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant

to §78-2-2(3)(i) as this is an appeal
the

Seventh

Judicial

District

from

Court

a
for

final

order

Duchesne

of

County

concerning title to real property.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.
pass

Does ownership of a

to

the

debtor's

petition

for

relief

debtor's

bankruptcy
if

the

right

estate

property

in

upon

of

redemption

filing

of

a

question was under

foreclosure at the time of filing but had not been sold?
A.
"bankrupt's

If

the

interest"

bankruptcy
in

real

trustee

abandons

the

property pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

554, does the trustee also automatically abandon the

rights

of

redemption to that property?
B*

Is

right personal to

a
the

right

of

debtor

redemption to real property a

or

a

right

attached

to

real

property subject to redemption?
C*

Is

a

redemption

right

an

an

after

after a foreclosure that constitutes

asset that arises
acquired

asset

of the bankrupt's estate, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(7)?
II.

Is

a

right

of

redemption

to

real property an

asset subject to execution under Utah law?
III.
Utah

Rules

comply

In order to redeem real property
of

or

Civil

Procedure,

substantially

must

comply

a

redemptor

with

the

requirements of Rule 69, U.R.C.P., and was
of

substantial

compliance

justified

under

the

under

Rule

69,

strictly
procedural

Court's

Ruling

the facts of this

case?
IV.
must

the

In order to properly
redemptor

post

the

redeem

under

Rule

69(f)(3)

amount of the sale bid price or

the amount of the underlying lien in

order

to

underlying debt?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
See Statutory Appendix.

-2-

extinguish

the

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Appellant

corporation

in

the

Tech-Fluid

Services,

Inc.

is

a

business of providing oil well services to

wells in the eastern Utah area. (R.l)
2.
appeal)

Paiute Oil and Walker Energy (not

were

the

owner

parties

to

this

of mineral interests in the following

described real property: (R.l)
Section 13, Township 3 South, Range 5
FNL
932
FEL,
Duchesne
County,
Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1.
3.

On

August

West,
known

820
as

16, 1984, Tech-Fluid provided services,

equipment and labor to the

Paiute

well

pursuant

to

contract

between Tech-Fluid and Paiute Oil.
4.
$69,708.30.

Tech-Fluid
Paiute did

provided
not

pay

material
for

any

and
of

labor

the

worth

materials,

labor or services rendered to it by Tech-Fluid. (R.2)
5.

Tech-Fluid

filed

an

the Duchesne County Recorder's

Amended

Office

on

Notice of Lien with
November

30, 1984.

(R.2)
6.

On

January

to foreclose its
Energy,

Duchesne

lien.

24, 1984, Tech-Fluid filed a complaint
Paiute

County,

and

Oil,
Gulf

defendants.(R.l-6)

-3-

Sam
Oil

Oil,

Inc., Walker

Corp.

were named as

7.

On

Corporation

December

filed

Chapter 11

of

Bankruptcy

a

the

Court

18f

1985," Paiute

voluntary

Bankruptcy
for

the

Oil

reorganization
Code

Mining

petition under

with

the

of

Utah.

District

&

United- States
All - actions

against Paiute were stayed by the filing of that Petition.
8.
that

the

On February 25, 1986,
answers

of

the

District

of

ordered

defendants Sam Oil, Inc., Walker Energy,

Chevron USA, Inc. and Duchesne County be
judgment

Court

stricken

and

foreclosure of Tech-Fluid. (R.423-424).

granted
A copy of

the Court's Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
9.
the

Tech-Fluid obtained an order

automatic

stay

on

granting

relief

from

May 18, 1987 as to Paiute Oil. (R.427)

A copy of the Court's Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "B."1
10.

On May

authorizing

20,

foreclosure

1987, T^ch-Fluid
and

a public

obtained

sale

an

pursuant

order
to the

provisions of the Mechanic Lien Foreclosure Act. (R.426)
11.
sheriff's

Tech-Fluid

sale

and

an

subsequently
execution

together with interest. (R.435)

The

filed

a

notice

of

in the amount of $86,943.64
property

was

sold

July

2, 1987 to Tech-Fluid for $4000. (R.443-444)
12.

On

December

31,

1987, Paiute

Oil,

through

director Walter Davidson, purportedly assigned Paiute Oil's

-4-

a

redemption
(R.462)

rights
A

copy

to
of

Wind

the

River

assignment

Resources
is

Corporation.

attached

hereto

as

Exhibit "C."
13.
by

an

The assignment has

purportedly

acknowledged

unidentified notary without a seal being apparent on the

face of the copy.
14.
the

been

Exhibit "C" (R.462)

On January 1, 1^88,

following

Documents

on

Wind

an

River

on

duty

Resources
dispatcher

served
at

the

Duchesne County Sheriff's Office:
Exhibit

w

D n - Cashier's check in the sum of $4310.00

Exhibit "E" - Assignment of Rights of Redemption
Exhibit "F" - Notice of Redemption
Exhibit
15.

n

G" - Sheriff's Redemption Certificate

On

January

8, 1988, plaintiff filed a motion for

order to show cause why the Sheriff should not issue a

deed

to

Tech-Fluid based upon an invalid redemption. (R.492-53)
16.
heard

on

The
January

Court
19,

issued
1988

an

at

order

1:30

to show cause to be

in

Duchesne

County

Courthouse. (R.454-55)
17.

The

Court

held

a hearing on January 19, 1988 on

plaintiff's order to show cause.

Counsel

for

Tech-Fluid

Wind River argued the case to the Court and were given ten

-5-

and

days to submit briefs. (R.456)
18.

The

ruling that the
could

not

Court

issued

assignment

be

executed

its Ruling on February 5, 1988

was

upon

valid,
and

rights

Wind

redemption under Rule 69 because it had
with

Rule

69.

of

redemption

River was entitled to
substantially

complied

Finally, the Court ordered that Tech-Fluid had

no further interest in the well. (R.569-570)
19.
and

On February 10,

accompanying

objecting

to

1988

memorandum

the

amount

of

of

Tech-Fluid

filed

a

motion

law pursuant to Rule 69(f)(3)

money

posted

by

Wind

River.

Tech-Fluid requested a hearing on its motion. (R.581-585)
20.

On

February

Alter or Amend the ruling
whether

plaintiff's

11, 1988 plaintiff filed a Motion to
(R.572-573)

raising

the

issues

of

lien is extinguished and whether the Court

misapplied this Court's holding

in

J.A.

Mollerup

v.

Storage

Systems International, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977). (R.572-80)
21.

Wind

River

filed responses to plaintiff's motion

and filed a motion for sanctions. (R.586-599)
22.
sanctions
plaintiff's

Plaintiff responded
(R.600-602)
other

to

Wind

River's

motion

for

and replied to Wind River's responses to

motions.

(R.603-608)

Plaintiff

filed

a

request for ruling on all motions before the Court. (R.609-610)

-6-

23.

On

February

29, 1988 the Court issued its ruling

denying all post hearing motions. (R.611)
24.

The Court signed its Conclusions of Law

and

Order

on February 29, 1988. (R.612-617)
25.

Plaintiff

filed

a

Notice

to

filing

of Appeal on March 3,

1988. (R.619-620)
26.
Appeal,

Subsequent

defendant

Wind

River

plaintiff's

Resources

Notice

of

sold its-interest to

Gavilan Operating Incorporated.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred
redemption
December

to
31,

September

the

oil

1987.

1984

Paiute

sold

rights

them

that

the

rights

of

had

been

in

bankruptcy

since

and the redemption rights were an assets of its

are

trustee in bankruptcy.
they

ruling

well 13-ND-l belonged to Paiute Oil on

bankruptcy estate pursuant
Redemption

in

to

11

U.S.C.

541(a)(1)

and

(7).

interests in property which pass to the
Paiute Oil did not own the

Wind

trustee as owner of the

to

River

rights

on
never

rights

when

December 31, 1987 and the
sold

or

abandoned

the

rights. As such Wind River Resource's redemption is invalid.
Wind

River's

redemption

is

also

void for failure to

comply with the mandatory requirements Utah Rules of Civil

-7-

Procedure Rule 69

governing

River

file

failed

foreclosure

to
and

acknowledged
affidavit

a

redemptions.

showing

failed

of

the

to

rights;
amount

provide

and

failed

due

on

deficiencies render the redemption void for
to

the

minimal

Wind

certified copy of the order*granting

execution;

assignment

Specifically,

procedural

requirements

a

properly

to

file

the

lien.

failure
of

to

an
The

adhere

Rule 69(f), Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure,
The trial court erred
substantially

complied

when

with

it

the

held

that

provisions

"Substantial compliance" is not a basis for the
relief

to

Wind

River

proceed in equity.
Storage
mandates

Systems

absent

some

reason

This Court's decision in

engaged
relief.

in

no

Because

court
for

the court to

J.A.

Mollerup

1122

(Utah

compliance

with

Rule

69.

This

the

69.

granting

P.2d

to

River

Rule

569

strict

inapplicable

of

International,

decision in United States v. Loosley, 551 P.d
is

Wind

506

v.

1977),
Court's

(Utah

1976)

facts of this case because Tech-Fluid

inequitable

conduct

justifying

equitable

Wind River failed to comply with Rule 69, the

redemption is void.
Wind River also failed to
money for redemption.

post

the

In order to redeem.

-8-

proper

amount

Wind River must

of

post

the

entire

amount

due- on the lien with interest.

69(f)(3) provides for payment of the entire
redeem
River

under
need

a

lien foreclosure.

only

Tech-Fluidfs

lien

post

the

is

still

in

order

to

In the alternative, if Wind

amount
in

lien

Rule

of

tact

the

sale,

then

and Tech-Fluid may once

again foreclose its lien.

Redemption

and

to its property as if there had been

restored

no sale.

the

debtor

only

stopped

the

sale

The property is therefore encumbered by the lien.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION IS A SEPARATE ASSET OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE THAT HAD NOT BEEN ABANDONED OR SOLD BY THE
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE AND THEREFORE DID NOT BELONG TO PAIUTE OIL
ON DECEMBER 31, 1987.
Paiute

Oil

filed

for Bankruptcy on December 18, 1985,

and the case is still pending.
under

the

protection

Paiute Oil was

2,

1988.

redemption

rights

knowledge

or

On
to

consent

still

of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code

throughout the entire redemption period
January

therefore

December
Wind

the

July

Resources

1987

Bankruptcy

without
Trustee

Bankruptcy Court and without notice and opportunity
the rights by any creditor.

21,

to

The first issue presented is

-9-

to

31, 1987, Paiute assigned its

River

of

of

the

or

the

bid

on

whether

Paiute

Oil

or

the Bankruptcy estate owned the rights

of redemption.
Tech-Fluid
against

the

Paiute

had
oil

filed

its

Well

lien

13-1

foreclosure

prior

action

to Paiute's filing

bankruptcy.

When Paiute filed for

stayed

further action against Paiute by Tech-PLuid and all

other

all

creditors.

redemption

rights

The

first

Bankruptcy,

sub-issue

11

is

U.S.C.

whether

362

the

became property of the estate at the time of

filing.
The relevant part of 11 O.S.C. 5541(a) provides:
(a)

The commencement of a case under Section
301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an
estate. Such estate is comprised of all
the
following property wherever located
and by whomever held:
(1)

. . .
all
legal
or
equitable
interests of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the case

(7)

Any interest in property that
estate
acquires
after
commencement of the case.

. . .

The

broad

language of 5541(a)(1) encompasses all legal

and equitable interests owned by
filing

the

the
the

petition.

the

Numerous

debtor
courts

at
have

the
held

time
that

mortgagor's redemption rights is an asset of the estate over

-10-

of
a

which the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction.
43

B.R.

See In

re

313, 11 C.B.C.2d 1057 (BC ND 111. 1984); Ravenswood v.

Patzhold# 27 B.R. 542 (BC ND 111. 1982); In Re Markee,
429,

Smith,

8

C.B.C.2d 1331 (BC DC Idaho 1983).

Indeed,

31

B.R.

most courts

which have looked at the issues of who may sell

the

rights,

the District of

Utah,

including

have

the

Bankruptcy

specifically

redemption

with

held

See

In

(B.C.D. Utah 1980)
Grosso

that

for

the

debtors

equity

of

its rights to exercise, sell or transfer these

rights pass to and can only
Bankruptcy.

Court

redemption

be

by

the

trustee

in

re Patio Springs, Inc., 6 B.R.W. 428, 431

(construing

Investment,

exercised

Inc.

Utah

457

(construing Arizona law); In re

law); In

F.2d

Bank

168

of

re

(9th

the

Thomas
Cir.

J.

1972)

Commonwealth,

6

C.B.C. 699 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (construing Michigan law).
The

Patio

Springs

the

Bankruptcy

matter of law that the debtor's right of
the

Court

stated as a

redemption

passes

bankruptcy

trustee

when the debtor is in bankruptcy.

debtor in Patio

Springs

filed

Chapter

the

in

Weber

11

of

County

Security Bank.

a

petition

Bankruptcy Act.

encumbered

by

a

for

relief

to
The

under

The debtor owned property
first

mortgage

rd. at 6 B.R. 428. Pursuant to

the

by

First

orders

of

the Bankruptcy Court, the stay against First Security Bank was

-11-

vacated
1979.
six

and

the

bank

was allowed to foreclose on October 18f

On April 27, 1980, one day prior
month

statutory

period

to

of

expiration

redemption*

adjudicated the debtor bankrupt and appointed
trustee

subsequently

11(e)

of

the

period for 60 days, the
the

debtor's

the

the
Court

trustee.

The

made application to the Court to sell the

bankrupt's right of redemption.
whether

a

of

Td.

Bankruptcy
Court

Although

the

issue

was

Act extended the redemption

quite

clearly

recognized

that

right of redemption belongs to the trustee if the

debtor is in bankruptcy proceedings.
As the Court stated:
It is, first of all, essential to note that the
equity of redemption, and its concomitant rights
to exercise or transfer such,
are
property
rights
of
the
debtor
which
the
trustee
succeeds.
See Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, 96
Utah 297, 85 P.2d 770, 775 (1938)
Patio Springs at 6 BRW 431.
Thus, the Bankruptcy Court
construing

Utah's

Redemption

of redemption belonged
opinion

is

in

accord

to

Statute

the

with

for

trustee

the

District

of

Utah

has held that the right
in

Bankruptcy.

This

the Court's decision in Layton v.

Layton, 140 P.2d 759 (Utah 1943).
The Layton Court recognizes that the rights of
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redemption owned by the debtor pass to

the

Bankruptcy

estate.

As the Court stated:
It is evident, therefore, that the only right or
interest in this property which became subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court was the right of redemption.
Id. at 761.
In another part of the opinion the Court stated:
I am also clearly of
the
view
that
the
foreclosure
sales
and
the issuance of the
sherifffs certificates thereunder operated
to
extinguish all of the mortgagor's property in
and to the real estate involved, save only the
bare legal title, coupled with the statutory
right of possession and the right of redemption
within the time allowed by statute.
These are
valuable
property rights, and the bankruptcy
court undoubtedly has jurisdiction over them.
Id. at 763.
In

(Emphasis added)
this

case,

however,

a

trial Court ruled that the

trustee abandoned the redemption rights when she
well

pursuant

three separate

to

the

reasons

Bankruptcy
why

this

Court's
ruling

abandoned

order.
is

the

There are

erroneous

as

a

matter of law.
A.

The

personal right

asset of the debtor's right of redemption is a
of

the

debtor

and

does

not

constitute

any

interest in the well itself.
The

right

of

redemption

was created by statute which

is silent as to the exact nature of the right.
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The statutory

language has
Circuit

remained

discussed

essentially

where

Utah's

the

Cir. 19.43)f.4a

redemption

plaintiff

law.

Thereafter

formerly

in

the

involved

a

in

owned

same

bankruptcy

farm

month

he

case

executed

In

on

his

a second

transferred

the

February

1, 1937, Thayne instituted

foreclosure proceedings on

Layton's

second

the

Thayne.

a

case

On

to

to

10th

Utah.

mortgage

mortgage to the Rural Rehabitation Corp. which
mortgage

the

Layton

December 1936 he gave the Davis County Bank a
farm.

since

the nature of the redemption right in Layton

v. Thayne. 133 F.2d 287 (10th
construing

unchanged

first

mortgage.

to his wife.

The

judgment

sale.

and

Thayne

The

mortgaae

Layton

made

foreclosure

proceeded

bank

sheriff

issued

and

delivered

a

I_d. at 288.

first

mortgagor

then

instituted

purchased

the

property

a

physically

removed

from

after the sale.
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foreclosure
the

sale

for less than the amount of

its claim and Layton became a judgment
Layton

to

no attempt to redeem within

action which also proceeded to judgment and sale. At
the

subject

On February 15 Layton deeded the farm

the statutory period and the
deed to Thayne.

mortgage,

debtor.

The

bank

had

the property by writ two days

Shortly
redemption

before

the

the

bankfs

under

expiration

foreclosure

filed an amended petition

in

bankrupt.

asserted

Layton

then

Bankruptcy

possession of his farm during
to

the

the

the

period

of

proceedings, Layton
and

that

he

was

adjudicated

had

redemption

a

right

period

of

pursuant

provisions of the Bankruptcy Act governing agricultural

composition or extension proceedings.
strike

of

the

farm

from

his

The creditors

schedule

sought

to

due to the fact that the

Thayne foreclosure divested Layton of all his

interest

in

the

property.
The

Court

ruled

that

personal right under Utah law
itself

which

possession
289-290.

of

would
the

have

farm

or

the
and

right

not

a

entitled
the

fruits

of redemption was a
right

in

the

Layton

to

immediate
Id.

thereof.

land

at

As the Court stated:

It
is concede that under the laws of Utah
appellant has a right of redemption.
This right
of
redemption
is
within
the
protective
provisions of the act . . . but it does not
follow that, because a distressed farmer has a
right of redemption, he is entitled to
the
possession
thereof,
together
with
income
therefrom, in a farmer debtor proceeding.
In reasoning

why

the

right

of

redemption

does

grant Layton a right of possession in the land the Court
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not

stated:
It (statutory right of redemption) is a mere
personal privilege rather than an interest or
estate in land.
It maybe exercised only by
those
persons
named in the statute
(citation omitted)
and only by
them
after
foreclosure.
It
does
not
constitute
any
interest or estate in the real estate itself.
Layton v, Thayne, 133 F.2d at 289. (Emphasis added)
The

right

of

redemption

does not go with the land.
the

trustee

when

is

therefore

As such, it

was

not

an asset that
abandoned

by

she abandoned the well and remained property

of the estate as does any other personal right of the debtor.
There are strong
right

of

redemption

policy

remains

reasons
the

for

property

holding

The

purpose

behind

debtors

assets

for

by

the

the bankruptcy stay is to grant

the debtor breathing space to allow an
the

a

of the bankruptcy

estate even though the underlying property is abandoned
trustee.

that

orderly

marshalling

of

sale and distribution to creditors in

an orderly and equitable manner.
The definition contained in
broad

as

possible

equitable interests.
encompasses

the

11

O.S.C.

§541(a>

is

as

so as to include all the debtor's legal and
Courts

following

have

held

that

causes of action:

this

definition

personal injury,

Tignor v, Parkinson, 729 F.2d 977 (CA 4th Cir 1984); business
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torts,

Moore

property

v.

Slonimf

damage, In

1975); and

breach

re

of

426

F.Supp.

524

Winters, 424

contract

(DC

F.Supp.

actions

-

In

Com

1977)j

1389

(ED Mo.

re

J.

Robert

Pierson, Inc. 44 BR 556 (ED Pa 1984).
In
the

Court

re

Taylorf

determined

21

B.R.

that

179, 180 (B.C. W.D. Mo 1982),

under

redemption is a cause of action

of

Missouri
the

law

debtor

a
to

right
which

of
the

trustee in bankruptcy succeeds upon filing of a petition.
These

cases

clearly

bankruptcy is to use whatever
the

debtor

may

indicate

that

nonexempt

the policy behind

interest

in

property

own to satisfy the claims, of creditors. Righ*-

of redemption are assets that

should

be

administered

by

the

trustee to satisfy the claims of creditors.
This

conclusion

is

supported

by Bankruptcy Rule 6008

which provides:
On motion by the debtorf trustee or debtor in
possession and after hearing an notice as the
Court may direct, the Court may authorize the
redemption of property from a lien or from a
sale to enforce a lien in
accordance
with
applicable law.
Rule

6008

clearly

indicates that rights of redemption

are property of the estate to be exercised only

after

of the court with notice to the secured creditor. Thus
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approval

although

the

trustee

abandoned "the bankrupts interest in the

well" it did not abandon the right of redemption and

the

right

of redemption remained property of the estate.
B.

The

redemption

of the debtor and

rights were not listed,as an asset

therefore

could

not

be

abandoned

by

the

trustee pursuant to 11 D,S,C> 554.
Assets

of

the

Bankruptcy estate may be abandoned only

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 554 because of the
of

mandating

court

code's

Inc.,

provides
abandon

43

that

B.R.
after

property

policies

approval for abandonment and administering

the estate for the benefit of all creditors.
West,

twin

of

761

(DC

notice
the

Utah

and

estate

See,

1984).

In

11

re

Auto

U.S.C. §554

hearing,

the

that

of inconsequential

is

trustee

may

value and benefit to the estate.
The record is clear that
the

redemption

rights

per

the

in

the

the

rule

estate

abandoned.

11

of
until

never

abandoned

se. Gavilon appears to argue that

the rights went with abandonment of
avoids

trustee

the

well.

This

argument

law that all the debtors property remains
the

U.S.C.

property

554(d).

The

property of the bankruptcy estate has
burden of proving abandonment.

is

administered

party

been

asserting

abandoned

has

or
that
the

Riverside Memorial Mausoleum,
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Inc. v. Orret, 469 F.Supp 643 (ED Pa 1979).
In

this

case

the rights of redemption were not listed

as an abandoned asset and therefore could only be
trustee.

This

fact

was

implicitly

when it turned over the proceeds
trustee

in

successor

from

sold

by

the

recognized by Paiute Oil
the

assignment

to

the

bankruptcy on January 11, 1988. Wind River and its
in

interest

therefore

have

failed

to

establish

abandonment of the redemption rights to the debtor.
C.

In

the

alternative/

the

rights

of

redemption

became an after acquired asset of the bankruptcy estate.
Section

541(a)(7)

was

a

new

addition, to

Bankruptcy Code which has no counterpart in the

old

the

Bankruptcy

The Legislative history of Section 541(a)(7) is
new. The provision clarifies that any interest
in property that the estate acquires after the
commencement of the case is property of the
estate. For example, if the estate enters into
a contract, after commencement of the case, such
a contract would be property of the estate.
The
addition of this provision of House amendment
merely clarifies
that
8541(a)
is
an
all
embracing definition which includes charges on
property such as liens held by the debtor on
property of a third party, or the beneficial
rights and interest that the debtor may have in
the property of another. . . .
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1978

In

re

Savary,

MD Pla 1986) is
involved

prepetition
automatic

illustrative

debtorfs

a

57 B.R. 298 (CH Bankr.L.Rptr• 70969- BC

and

tractor

sold

stay.

of

post

Tech-Fluid's

loader
petition

the

in

had been repleved

violation

debtor

or

the

trustee

proceeding

of

filing,

party

injured

was

the

when

it

the

this

case

trustee

filing.

In

its

order,

bankrupts interest in the well."
the

estatefs

the

The trustee

converted,

pursuant

to

inurred
asset

to

the

trustee

abandoned
did

not

"the

abandon

interest in the well. Accordingly, when

the foreclosure sale occurred on July 2,

541(a)(7).

the

the redemption rights existed due to the

upon

acquired

at

not the debtor

estate

passed

right

was

estate,

debtorfs legal title in the well which

of

place

Ijd. at 57 B.R. 298-300.

In

all

determine

was entitled to damages.

debtorfs

individually, and damages belonged to
541(a)(7).

the

legal title remained in the debtor and became

property of the estate. Accordingly,
the

of

to

The Court held that since the sale had not taken
time

Savary

After awarding $10,000 in damages against the

creditor, the court held an adversary
whether

which

claim.

1987,

the

redemption

to the benefit of the estate and became an after
of

the

bankruptcy

estate

pursuant

The bankruptcy estate therefore owned the rights
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to

of

redemption

throughout the period of redemption*. Wind River

acquired nothing by way of its assignment of

redemption

rights

because Paiute Oil never owned the rights.
POINT II
IN THE EVENT PAIUTE OIL OWNED THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION,
TECH-FLUID EXECUTED UPON THE ASSET PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT.
Generally, every kind of property or
not

otherwise

exempt

by

statute,

execution issued on a judgment.
As

noted,

statute.
as

rights

of

C.J.S.

interests

treat

in

transferable.

See Carlguist

1926);

v.

Corey

be

therein,

reached

Executions

§18

by

an

p.152.

redemption are not expressly exempted by

Furthermore, Utah cases

property

may

interest

Roberts,

that

v.

rights
they

Coltharp,

of
are

348

P.

redemption
completely
481

(Utah

25 P.2d 940 (Utah 1933); Bennion v.

Amoss, 530 P.2d 810 (Utah 1975).
The Utah Supreme
this

asset

in

several

Court

has

cases.

discussed

the

statute.

To

period
this,

of
the

nature

of

In Mollerup v. Storage Systems

International, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), the
extended

the

lower

court

had

redemption beyond that established by
Supreme

Court

admonished

the

court by stating:
that no tender was ever made since the
bankrupt estate was and is entirely
without
assets and that the only prospect of an "asset"
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lower

is the value, if any, of the right of redemption
for which he is hopeful of finding a purchaser.
.Id. at 1124.
Accordingly,
term a right of
consistently

although

redemption
treat

the

a

statute

property

it

as

interest,

though

characteristics in that it has value

does not expressly

and

it
is

Utah

has

cases

property

transferable

and

as such should be subject to execution.
Additional

support

for

permitting execution on rights

of redemption is found in Evans v. Humphrey, 5 P.2d
1931).

In

Evans,

jurisdictions on
judgment

the

the

debtor's

Idaho

subject

Court
but

equitable

execution sale was subject to levy
executions.

Id.

at

similar to that of Utah's
has

been

affirmed

547.

acknowledged

nonetheless

right
and

Idaho's

redemption

545

of
sale

(Idaho

a split of

found

that

redemption,
under

redemption
statute.

after

subsequent
statute

This

in a recent Idaho case as well.

a

is

position
See Suchan

v. Suchan, 741 P.2d 1289 (Idaho 1986).
POINT III
WIND RIVER RESOURCES' REDEMPTION WAS
INVALID
FOR
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 69(f), U.R.C.P.
Utah

Rules

of

Civil Procedure, Rule 69(f) governs the

procedural requirements for a valid redemption.
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Rule 69(f)(2)

provides:
At the time of redemption the person seeking thfc
same may make payment of the amount required to
the person from whom the property is
being
redeemed, or for him to the officer who made the
sale or his successor in office.
At the same
time
the
redemptioner
must produce to the
officer or person from whom he seeks to redeem,
and serve with his notice to the officer:
(Emphasis added)
• • •

(1)

a certified copy of
judgment under which
to redeem;

(2)

an assignment, properly
proved
where the same
establish his claim;

(3)

an affidavit by himself or
his
showing the amount due on the lien.

When

Wind

dispatcher

at

River

the

the docket of the
he claims the right
acknowledged
is necessary

or
to

agent

filed for redemption is served upon a

Duchesne

Sherifffs

County

Office

the

following documents:
1)

A copy of an Assignment of Rights (Exhibit E ) ;

2)

A Notice of Redemption (Exhibit F ) ;

3)

Sheriff's

Certificate

of

Redemption (Exhibit G ) ;

and
4)

A cashier's check in the sum

D).
Wind River filed no other documents.
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of

$4310.00

(Exhibit

Wind
order

of

River

failed

foreclosure.

evidencing

the

to

file

a

Moreover,

assignment

notary seal or signature.

does

certified

the
not

copy of the

original

supply

Finally, Wind River

a

Document

recognizable

failed

to

file

an affidavit showing the amount due on the lien.
The

trial

Court

nonetheless

ruled

that

Wind

River

substantially complied with Rule 69 and authorized redemption.
The

trial

court

erred

in

authorizing

because substantial compliance is not the
stated

is

the

law

regarding

standard

compliance

with

this
Rule

Mollerup v. Storage Systems International, 569 P.2d
1977),

this

Court

held

redemption
Court
69. In

1122

(Utah

that a redemptor must strictly comply

with the requirements of statute.
In Mollerup, the trial
redemption

beyond

the

court

extended

the

period

of

six month period of redemption pursuant

to two ex parte orders submitted by
6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

the

redemptor

under

Reversing, the Court held:

The right of redemption has long been recognized
as a substantive right to be exercised in strict
accord
with statutory terms.
It is not an
equitable right cured or regulated by principles
of equity but, rather, is a creature of statute
and depends entirely upon the provisions of the
statute creating the right.
Id. 569 P.2d at 1124 (Emphasis added)
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Rule

Wind

River's

efforts

to

redeem

clearly

constitute strict compliance with the terms of

the

do

not

statute

as

mandated by this Court's decision in Mollerup.
The

Court

found

69 is sufficient to
arguendo

that

because

they

establish

the

compliance/ the

that substantial compliance with Rule
a

documents

redemption

valid
filed

still

is

redemption.
constitute
invalid

551

substantial

under

Mollerup

were not in strict compliance with statute. Wind

River however cited this Courtfs decision in
Loosley/

Assuming

United

States

v.

P.2d 506 (Utah 1976) for support that substantial

compliance is sufficient to justify redemption.
Loosley involved the same deficiencies as in
with

the

exception

that

challenging

the

validity

difference

between

creditor-purchaser

this
knew

in

this
of

case
of

held

that

the

deficiencies

the
and

the

failed to notify the redemptor.

case

assignment.

deficiencies

in

were

sitting

insufficient

redemption because the creditor- purchaser knew 24
to

the

expiration

is

also

The

is

Court

case

Tech-Fluid

Loosley's

The

this

that

chief
the

Loosley and
in

equity

to defeat the
hours

prior

of the redemption period of the redemptor*s

technical deficiencies in the redemption.

The

creditor

to inform the redemptors even after a phone call by the
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failed

redemptor

asking

redemption*

Ij3. at

Court

held

that

grant

the

if

there

507.
the

were

Under

trial

redemption

the

court,

despite

misconduct and waiver on the

any

the

deficiencies

facts

of

sitting

in

the

Loosley,

the

in equity, could

deficiencies

part

of

case

are

the

due

to

the

creditor-mortgagee*

IcU at 508.
The
from

facts

Loosley

in

of

this

that

Tech-Fluid

had

clearly distinguishable
no

knowledge

redemption until after the period to redeem had
Court's

decision

in

Mollerup

specifically

expired.

United

accident,
States

Mollerup,

569

v.

mistake

or

Loosley,

in

Utah,

69(f).

relief

for

551

P.2d

506

(1976). *

P.2d at 1124. There are simply no facts in this

equity

as

redemption

to

grant

Wind

River

there was no fraud, accident, mistake or

waiver on the part of Tech-Fluid.
River's

This

waiver as was found to exist in

case to move the conscience of the court
relief

the

limits Loosley to

instances where a court sitting in equity may grant
"fraud,

of

be

denied

Mollerup mandates

that

Wind

for failure to comply with Rule

To allow redemption under these facts

will

render

the

requirements of Rule 69 advisory.
Moreover,

absent

inequitable

conduct

on

the part of

the creditor, substantial compliance is a bad rule and may
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lead to further litigation
compliance.

This

compliance

in

Court

recent

721

was

verification.
the

that case.
v,

frowned

upon

substantial

Cascade

name

furnished

and

This Court held

doctrine

of

Corp.y

660

631

the

the
the

person
notice

lien

proper

to

whom

lacked

invalid

the

proper

refusing

to

substantial compliance to the facts of

Icl. at 722-723.

Hansen,

of

See also, First

P,2d

919

(Utah

verification

of

the

Security

Mortgage

1981) (where this Court

rejected plaintiff's substantial compliance
that

substantial

(Utah 1983), the lien claimant filed a notice of lien

material

Co.

has

constitutes

In Graff v. Boise

that failed to contain the

apply

what

cases construing the notice requirements

of Utah's lien statute.
P.2d

over

argument

and

held

lien notice was a mandatory

condition precedent to creation of a valid lien).
Although substantial compliance has
law

to

place

in

the

prevent creditors from engaging in inequitable conduct,

it simply does not apply
Court

its

should

reverse

to
the

the

facts

decision

of

of
the

this

trial

remand for a decision denying redemption for failure
with Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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case.

This

court and
to

comply

POINT IV
WIND RIVER'S REDEMPTION IS INVALID FOR FAILURE TO POST
THE PROPER AMOUNT FOR REDEMPTION, WHICH IS THE FULL VALUE OF
TECH-FLUID'S LIEN,
As
sale*
the

previously

indicated,

Wind River Resources posted
well.

This

is

not

Tech-Fluid bid $4000 at the
$4310.00

as

redemption

on

the proper amount in order to redeem

pursuant to Rule 69(f)(3).

Wind River must post the

amount

of

the lien with interest.
Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
The property may be redeemed from the purchaser
within six months after the sale on paying the
amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon .
. . and, if the purchaser is also a creditor
having
a lien prior to that of the person
seeking redemption, other than
the
judgment
under which sad purchaser was made, the amount
of such lien with interest. (Emphasis added)
"Purchaser11 means
redeem,

Wind

River

Tech-Fluid.

In

order

to

properly

needed to post the amount of the lien with

interest.
At
provision

trial, Wind
only

River

applies

to

argued
other

need

only

post

extinguish the lien.

the

sale

the

lienholders

seeking to redeem and not an assignee
who

that

price

of

the

or

underlined
creditors

judgment

to satisfy the debt and

This conclusion is flawed because it
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debtor

fails to
which

recognize

provides:

the
"If

specific

language

in

Rule

69(f)(5)

the judgment debtor redeems he must make

the same payments as are required

to

effect

redemption

by

a

creditor."
Other

courts

looking

at

the

issue have specifically

held that the entire amount of the debt must be

paid

to

seminal case is

redeem,

not

just

the

sale

price*

Collins v, Riggs, 81 U.S. 491, 20 L.Ed.2d

The
723

in

(1872),

order

wherein

the Court held:
To redeem property which has been sold under a
mortgage for less than the mortgage debt, it is
not
sufficient to tender the amount of the
sale. The whole mortgage debt must be tendered
or
paid into court.
The party offering to
redeem, proceeds upon the hypothesis that, as to
him, the mortgage has never been foreclosed it
is still in existence.
Therefore he can only
lift it by paying it. The money will be subject
to distribution between the mortgagee and the
purchaser, in equitable proportions, so as to
reimburse the latter his purchase money and pay
the former the balance of this debt.
Id. at 81 U.S. at 498, 20 L.Ed.2d at 724.
Numerous
regarding

the

courts
amount

have

necessary

National Bank of Orlando v. R.G.G.,
1977);

United

States

v.

adopted
for
348

the

Collins

redemption.
So.2d

621

Sun
(Fla

rule
First
App.

Brosnan, 264 F.2d 762, 766 (3rd Cir.

1959); Garuich v. Associates Financial Services Co., 435 So.2d
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30 (Ala 1983) (when
amount

of

the

mortgagee

debt

is

buys

treated

at

foreclosure

sale

the

as the purchase price rather

than the amount bid.)
This rule was codified in
requires

the

28

U.S.C.

2410(d)(1)

which

United States to post the amount of the debt, not

just the sale price, if it wants to redeem property

sold

under

a lien.
Policy
rule.
Before

support this court adopting the Collins

The creditor takes security
the

debtor

free and clear
should

reasons

be

of

should
the

be

for

payment

of

the

debt.

entitled to redeem the property

creditors

lien,

the

underlying

debt

paid in full. All parties would obtain exactly what

they were entitled to under their

contractual

rights

and

the

debtors property rights are protected.
The

alternative

by paying the sale
This

rule,

bid

would be to allow the debtor to redeem
price

but

810

extinguish

the

lien.

although more cumbersome, appears to be the current

rule of law regarding redemption.
P.2d

not

In

Bennion

v.

Amoss,

530

(Utah 1975), this Court held that a redemption by the

assignee of the judgment debtor "restores the
as

if

no

sale

same

condition

812.

Rule 69(f)(5) provides "if the debtor redeems, the
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had

property

been attempted."

to

the

icL at

effect

of

the

sale

is

terminated

and he is restored to his

estate.
Thus a redemption terminates
leaving

the

property

was

of

its

extinguished

lien.
by

had

taken

notice

Wind
the

however shows that it was
sale

effect

place."

up

a

new

and

the

sale

Tech-Fluid

sale

to

obtain

River argued the Tech-Fluid lien

sale.

The

restored

by

above

quoted

redemption

language

"as

if

no

The better rule of law would require

the debtor to post the entire amount of the
redeem

of

still encumbered by the Tech-Fluid lien.

Tech-Fluid can at any time
payment

the

urges

this

lien

Court

in
to

order
adopt

to
that

interpretation of Rule 69.
CONCLUSION
Tech-Fluid
reverse

the

respectfully

judgment

of

the

requests
trial

that

court

and

this

Court

remand

instructions to issue the Sheriff's Deed to Tech-Fluid.
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of July, 1988.
McRAE & DeLAND

HARRY H./SOUVM.L ^
Attoxn«y for Appellant
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with

CERTIFICATE OP DELIVERY
I

do

hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered

four (4) true and correct
Appellant

to

Clark

copies

of

B. Allred,

East Main Street, Vernal,

Utah

the

Attorney
84078

July, 1988.
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on

foregoing

Brief

of

for Respondent, 363
this

21st

day

of

Ettiibrr" A
ROBERT M. McRAE, #22X7
McRAE & DeLAND
Attorneys for Plaintiff
209 East 100 North
Vernal, UT 84078
(801) 789-1666
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TECH-FLUID SERIVCES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
Civil No. 85-CV-13D
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP.,
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY
GROUP, CHEVRON U.S.A. INC.,
and DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body
politic,
Defendants.

This Court, having heretofore entered it's Order
February 10, 1986, that defendants Sam Oil, Inc., Walker Energy
Group, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. and Duchesne County, a Body politic,
within 10 days file proof with this Court of any evidence of
ownership in that certain oil well and appurtenances thereto known
as 13ND-1 and no proof of ownership having been filed therein by
any of these defendants, IT IS ORDERED that their answers be
stricken and that a judgment of foreclosure issue in favor of
plaintiff as against said oil well.

FILED

7th DISTRICT COURT DUCHESNE
STATE OF UTAH

04^

FEB 251986
ROGER K. MARETT, 0«K

This Court# having been advised that defendant
Paiute Oil & Mining Corp. is under the jurisdiction of the
United Starters Bankruptcy Court/ District of Utah/ plaintiff's
rights as between this defendant will not be adjudicated at
this time.

.^

DATED this

ffy

day of February/ 1986.
BY THE COURT:

RICHARD C. DAVINDSON
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postaqe prepaid/ a copy
of the foregoing to the following on this Ir*
Mr. Kent H. Murdock
Attorney for Defendant Chevron
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
Dennis L. Draney
Attorney for Duchesne County
P.O. Box 206
Duchesne, UT 84021
Brent V. Manning
Attorney for Walker
50 South Main Street, #900
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Paul N. Cotro-Manes
Attorney for Paiute
311 South State, #280
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

042^

day of February, 1986,

Mr. Roland P. Uresk
Attorney for Saro Oil
156 North 200 East
Roosevelt, UT 84066

04;.'o

E^hib+ &
ROBERT M. McRAE, #2217
MCRAE & DeLAND
Attorneys for Plaintiff
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: 789-1666
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH

TECH-FLUID SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP.,
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY
GROUP, CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., and
DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body politic,

Civil No. 85-CV-13D

Defendants.

A certified

copy of the Release of Automatic Stay

provisions of the U. S. Bankruptcy Act having been filed with
this Order releasing the automatic stay provision as it may
apply to Paiute Oil & Mining Corp., IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
the Sheriff of Duchesne County post and conduct a public sale
as provided for by law in the Mechanic Lien Foreclosure Act.
DATED thi

day of May, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

thDISTRlCTCOUFrrOUCHESK

DENNIS L. DRANEY
District Court Judge

j UN t) 1987
HOGEHK.MAtttTi.UerK

042b

L. A. DEVER, #0875
McRAE & OeLAND
Attorneys for Tech-Fluid
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: 789-1666
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
In re:
PAIUTE OIL AND MINING
CORPORATION,

Bankruptcy No. 84C-02620
(Chapter 7)

Debtor.

ORDER GRANTING RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
AND ABANDONMENT
The motion of Tech-Fluids for relief from automatic
stay

came

before the Court; and no objections having been

filed to the motions; and after filing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that the automatic stay of Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code is terminated as to Tech-Fluids, effective upon entry of
this Order.

The trustee is ordered to abandon the bankrupt's

interest in Well ND13-1.
DATED this

/^T day May, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

/"
Rule 5003 ,'cx Designation
J Clerk .-. c ]••-. r?eJ to zr,i*r a copy
j"tor into the Court's Order Book,
fcntoy into Order Book not necessary.

1

v

#11 r^%*§oWtth9u^xed

and

«>«,.-

is a true and complete copy of a documen; c
file in the United States Bankruptcy CO«J
for the District of Utah.

Dated: W 18 jggj .-

0427

Attest:
•-. C **jcs^

-

•

'

^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid,
a copy of the Order in the Seventh Judicial District Court
and a copy of the Certified Order Granting Relief From Automatic
Stay and Abandonment to the following on this
of ttffi 1987.
Ms. Harriet E. Styler
8 East Broadway, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Mr. Richard Johns
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

ROBE

04^6

&<?rtj day

cxinu *
ASSIGNMENT OF REDEMPTION RIGHTS
Paiute Oil ^tyjyjfrl&A£?£P3££t*on' a u t a h corporation,
hereby assigns and conveys* to Wind River, Resources Corporation/
a Utah corporation/ all of Paiute's right/ title and interest
in the property described below/ plus all of Paiute's right to
redeem said property from the sale held on July 2# 1987
pursuant to an execution issued in the case of Tech-Fluid
Services/ Inc. vs. Paiute Oil * Mining Corp./ Civil No.
85-CV-13D in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne
County/ State of Utah. Wind River Resources Corporation is
hereby authorized to take any and all actions necessary to
redeem said property on its own behalf in the stead of Paiute
Oil & Mining Corporation.
The property to be redeemed is described as follows:
All operating and leasehold interest in
the Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1 Well located
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Se^ion 13/ Township
3 South/ Range 5 Westf^jbuchesne County,
Utah/ together with all rights/ privileges / franchise/ easements/ equipment/
machinery
or appliances
appurtenant
thereto.

Ite.

EXECUTED the S/c^ day of U&*S*^hi^

, 198T •

PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORPORATION

By:
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

l]al^lkj^tl^

ss.

On the
day otfJs)iSi*y-\*~>
/ 198^ , personally
appeared before me, UEA€fc k ^ ^ ^ - ^ j /
who, being by me duly
sworn, did say/ that he is .fete A J^^ST^VQf^
of Paiute Oil &
Mining Corporation/ and that this instrument was signed, in
behalf of .said corporation by authority of its bylaws# and said
yO&CpgF ( W f b ^ A J
acknowledged
to <~Mne
that
said
corporation executed the sa:

My/Commission Expires:

BtfrtbH* D

itU

Ftrst Securit 8an

°fUtah' N-A-

y *

Salt Lake G/y, Utah

SO-1042

848452921
Office No. 0 5 2 l a

D,fc 12Z31/87
••I, 310.00"

f " D U C H E S N E COUNTY S H E R I F F * *

•:* iil?..; *.X v.<> H C> i . W* £l\i* W W C U $
,
[OK 13-ND-l WELL
/Utifor^Mllfc
•KA.SN

•It*. .V.A.:

Authorized Signature
Signatur by:

i:0 2 23 101, 2 2<: a»*li&75&7

81,81,52^21

DtmJnmSecmOf Amk#7<

m

1
i

ASSIGNMENT OF REDEMPTION RIGHTS
Paiute Oil *„ty%£±y&A£9£PS££t±on'
* Utah corporation#
hereby assigns and conveys,*to Wina River Resources Corporation,
a Utah corporation, all of Paiute's right, title and interest
in the property described below, plus all of Paiute's right to
redeem said property from the sale held on July 2, 1987
pursuant to an execution issued in the case of Tech-Fluid
Services, Inc. vs. Paiute Oil * Mining Corp., Civil No.
85-CV-13D in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne
County, State of Utah. Wind River Resources Corporation is
hereby authorized to take any and all actions necessary to
redeem said property on its own behalf in the stead of Paiute
Oil a Mining Corporation.
The property to be redeemed is described as follows:
All operating and leasehold interest in
the Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1 Well located
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township
3 South, Range 5 Westf^buchesne County,
Utah, together with all rights, privileges , franchise, easements, equipment,
machinery
or appliances
appurtenant
thereto.
EXECUTED the S/*/- day of U&< &^hi^*

, 198T .

PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORPORATION

By:
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

LJg//^^

* ss

On the l*f day o f r J v c / ^ ^
, 198fr , personally
appeared before me, tJ&xefc ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ "
who, being by me duly
sworn, did say, that he is «fetee A
tei^E^TO^
of Paiute Oil *
Mining Corporation, and that this instrument was signed, in
behalf of Ksaid corporation by authority of its bylaws, and said
i*J&CX€F W ( h 3 0 A J
acknowledged
to -Nine
that
said
corporation executed the sa

My/Commission Expires;

Mm.

to<m b + F
NOTICE OP REDEMPTION
TO:

The Sheriff of Duchesne County, State of Utah.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on this date, Wind River
Resources Corporation, a Utah corporation, redeemed the following property from your sale thereof to Tech-Fluid Services,
Inc. on July 2, 1987 pursuant to an execution on a judgment
rendered in the case of Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. vs. Paiute
Oil & Mining Corp., et al, Civil Case No. 85-CV-13D in the
Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne County, State of
Utah.
The certificate of sale shows a purchase price of
$4,000. This amount plus interest of $240 and posting costs of
$70, for a total of $4,310 is hereby tendered to you in
accordance with Rule 69(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The property redeemed is described as follows:
All operating and leasehold interest in
the Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1 Well located
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township
3 South, Range 5 WestjJfBuchesne County,
Utah, together with all rights, privileges, franchise, easements, equipment,
machinery
or appliances
appurtenant
thereto.
Wind River Resources Corporation claims the right to
redeem the above property on the basis that it has received an
assignment from the judgment debtor of the judgment debtor's
redemption rights so that Wind River Resources Corporation is
the successor in interest of the judgment debtor for purposes
of redemption in accordance with Rule 69(f)(1) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Attached hereto and incorporated by
reference is an assignment of said redemption rights from the
judgment debtor.
IN

C^//

WITNESS

WHEREOF, this

Notice

is

executed

=*

WIND RIVER RESOURCES CORPORATION

By!

fU^^~i-

on

- 2
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss<
)

On the
/
day of fpij\JUL6^\ , 198J2./ personally
appeared before me ^T^M^xVHg.VVlg^
/who, being by me duly
sworn, did say, that he is the
W&*(b'C^>T~
of Wind River
Resources Corporation, and that the attached Notice of Redemption was signed in bej^fv^of said corporation by authority of
its bylaws, and said *Tty\|JftW^
acknowledged to me
that said corporation executed the same.

Iry PubliKTN

NAA_
j

Residing a t : \ f t f r ^ , r N
My Commission Expires:

|

UM

I
SHERIFF'S REDEMPTION CERTIFICATE
The undersignedi acting on behalf of the Sheriff of
Duchesne County, Utah, hereby certifies that on this date I
received from Wind River Resources Corporation, a Utah corporation, the sum of $4,310 in full redemption of the tract of land
and the property described below, from the sale thereof by the
Sheriff of Duchesne County, Utah to Tech-Fluid Services# Inc.
on July 2, 1987 pursuant to an execution issued on a judgment
in Civil Case No. 85-CV-13D in the Seventh Judicial District
Court of Duchesne County, State of Utah.
The property redeemed is described as follows:
All operating and leasehold interest in
the Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1 Well located
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township
3 South, Range 5 West,A"&uchesne County,
Utah, together with all rights, privileges, franchise, easements, equipment,
machinery or appliances appurtenant
thereto.
As support for and proof of its right to redeem, the
redemptioner produced an assignment of redemption rights from
the judgment debtor, Paiute Oil & Mining Corporation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this Certificate
at Duchesne, Utah on *~^\ o , ^
<
t 1988 .

•S I r
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE

Ox/ / ,

C)

~. rl i .

)
: ss.
)

On the J
day of M ^ A ^ t ^ ^ ^ , 198_£, personally
appeared before me l^VT^icc^ HfrgtUSOAJ vttfe"signer of the above
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

Notary Publico
_
.
Raiding a t : V % ^ r 7 V r ( > f e f
My Commission Expires
o\(o^C{

BANKRUPTCY CODE
In any particular case, especially a reorganization case, the determination of
which entity should be entitled to the difference between the going concern value
and the liquidation value must be based on equitable considerations arising from
the facts of the case. Finally, the determination of value is binding only for the
purposes of the specific hearing and is not to have a res judicata effect.
The first method of adequate protection outlined is the making of cash payments
to compensate for the expected decrease in value of the opposing entity's interest.
This provision is derived from In re Bermec Corporation, 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.
1971), though in that case it is not clear whether the payments offered were
adequate to compensate the secured creditors for their loss. The use of periodic
payments may be appropriate where, for example, the property in question is
depreciating at a relatively fixed rate. The periodic payments would be to
compensate for the depreciation and might, but need not necessarily, be in the
same amount as payments due on the secured obligation.
The second method is the fixing of an additional or replacement lien on other
property of the debtor to the extent of the decrease in value or actual consumption of the property involved. The purpose of this method is to provide the
protected entity with an alternative means of realizing the value of the original
property, if it should decline during the case, by granting an interest in
additional property from whose value the entity may realize its loss. This is
consistent with the view expressed in Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311
U.S. 273 (1940), where the Court suggested that it was the value of the secured
creditor's collateral, and not necessarily his rights in specific collateral, that was
entitled to protection.
The section makes no provision for the granting of an administrative priority as
a method of providing adequate protection to an entity as was suggested in In re
Yale Express System, Inc., 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967), because such protection
is too uncertain to be meaningful. (S. Rept. No. 95-989 to accompany S. 2266,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) pp. 49, 53, 54.)
Section 361 of the House amendment represents a compromise between H.R.
8200 as passed by the House and the Senate amendment regarding the issue of
"adequate protection" of a secured party. The House amendment deletes the
provision found in section 361(3) of H.R. 8200 as passed by the House. It would
have permitted adequate protection to be provided by giving the secured party
an administrative expense regarding any decrease in the value of such party's
collateral. In every case there is the uncertainty that the estate will have
sufficient property to pay administrative expenses in full.
Section 361(4) of H.R. 8200 as passed by the House is modified in section 361(3)
of the House amendment to indicate that the court may grant other forms of
adequate protection, other than an administrative expense, which will result in
the realization by the secured creditor of the indubitable equivalent of the
creditor's interest in property. In the special instance where there is a reserve
fund maintained under the security agreement, such as in the typical bondholder
case, indubitable equivalent means that the bondholders would be entitled to be
protected as to the reserve fund, in addition to the regular payments needed to
service the debt. Adequate protection of an interest of an entity in property is
intended to protect a creditor's allowed secured claim. To the extent the
protection proves to be inadequate after the fact, the creditor is entitled to a first
priority administrative expense under section 507(b).
In the special case of a creditor who has elected application of creditor making
an election under section 1111(b)(2), that creditor is entitled to adequate
protection of the creditor's interest in property to the extent of the value of the
collateral not to the extent of the creditor's allowed secured claim, which is
inflated to cover a deficiency as a result of such election. (124 Cong. Rec. H
11092 (Sept. 28, 1978).)

11 USCS § 362, Automatic stay
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section

11 USCS § 362
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301, 302, or 303 of this title [11 USCS § 301, 302, or 303], or an application filed
under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.
78eee(a)(3)) [15 USCS § 78eee(a)(3)], operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,
of—
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the
case under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.], or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title [11 USCS
§§ 101 et seq.];
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title [11
USCS §§ 101 et seq.];
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien
to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement
of the case under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.];
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.];
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title [11 USCS § 101 et seq.] against any claim
against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States
Tax Court concerning the debtor.
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title [11 USCS
§301, 302, or 303], or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)) [15 USCS § 78eee(a)(3)],
does not operate as a stay—
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of
a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor;
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of alimony, maintenance,
or support from property that is not property of the estate;
(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect an interest in
property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such
perfection under section 546(b) of this title [11 USCS § 546(b)] or to the extent
that such act is accomplished within the period provided under section
547(e)(2)(A) of this title [11 USCS § 547(e)(2)(A)];
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation
of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental
unit's police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment,
other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory
power;
(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commodity broker,
forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions, or securities clearing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with commodity
contracts, as defined in section 761(4) of this title [11 USCS §761(4)], forward
contracts, or securities contracts, as defined in section 741(7) of this title [11
USCS § 741(7)], that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a

11 USCS § 362
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margin payment, as defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title [11 USCS
§§ 741(5), 761(15)], or settlement payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this
title [11 USCS § 741(8)], arising out of commodity contracts, forward contracts,
or securities contracts against cash, securities, or other property held by or due
from such commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial
institutions, or securities clearing agency to margin, guarantee, or secure, or
settle commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts;
(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a repo participant, of any
mutual debt and claim under or in connection with repurchase agreements that
constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as
defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title [11 USCS §741(5) or 761(15)],
or settlement payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this title [11 USCS
§ 741(8)], arising out of repurchase agreements against cash, securities, or other
property held by or due from such repo participant to margin, guarantee, secure
or settle repurchase agreements;
(8) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement of any action by
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to foreclose a mortgage or
deed of trust in any case in which the mortgage or deed of trust held by the
Secretary is insured or was formerly insured under the National Housing Act
and covers property, or combinations of property, consisting of five or more
living units;
(9) under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance to the debtor by a
governmental unit of a notice of tax deficiency;
(10) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act by a lessor to the debtor
under a lease of nonresidential real property that has terminated by the expiration of the stated term of the lease before the commencement of or during a case
under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.] to obtain possession of such property; or
(11) under subsection (a) of this section, of the presentment of a negotiable
instrument and the giving of notice of and protesting dishonor of such an
instrument;
(12) under subsection (a) of this section, after the date which is 90 days after the
filing of such petition, of the commencement or continuation, and conclusion to
the entry of final judgment, of an action which involves a debtor subject to
reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of this title [11 USCS §§ 1101 et seq.] and
which was brought by the Secretary of Transportation under the Ship Mortgage
Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C 911 et seq.) [46 USCS §§911 et seq.] (including
distribution of any proceeds of sale) to foreclose a preferred ship or fleet
mortgage, or a security interest in or relating to a vessel under construction, held
by the Secretary of Transportation under section 207 or title XI of the Merchant
Marine Act, 1936 (46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271 et seq., respectively) [46 USCS
§ 1117 or §§ 1271 et seq., respectively], or under applicable State law; or
(13) under subsection (a) of this section, after the date which is 90 days after the
filing of such petition, of the commencement or continuation, and conclusion to
the entry of final judgment, of an action which involves a debtor subject to
reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of this title [11 USCS §§ 1101 et seq.] and
which was brought by the Secretary of Commerce under the Ship Mortgage Act,
1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.) [46 USCS §§911 et seq.] (including distribution of any proceeds of sale) to foreclose a preferred ship or fleet mortgage in a
vessel or a mortgage, deed of trust, or other security interest in a fishing facility
held by the Secretary of Commerce under section 207 or title XI of the
Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271 et seq., respectively)
[46 USCS § 1117 or §§ 1271 et seq., respectively].
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (0 of this section—

11 USCS § 362
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(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this
section continues until such property is no longer property of the estate; and
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section continues until
the earliest of—
(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title [11 USCS §§ 701 et seq.]
concerning an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title
[11 USCS §§ 901 et seq., 1101 et seq., 1201 et seq. or 1301 et seq.], the time a
discharge is granted or denied.
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by
terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay—
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property
of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of this
section, if—
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this section for relief from the
stay of any act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section,
such stay is terminated with respect to the party in interest making such request,
unless the court, after notice and a hearing, orders such stay continued in effect
pending the conclusion of, or as a result of, a final hearing and determination under
subsection (d) of this section. A hearing under this subsection may be a preliminary
hearing, or may be consolidated with the final hearing under subsection (d) of this
section. The court shall order such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion
of the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the
conclusion of such final hearing. If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing, then such final hearing shall be commenced not later than thirty days
after the conclusion of such preliminary hearing.
(0 Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or without a hearing, shall
grant such relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section as is
necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an entity in property, if
such interest will suffer such damage before there is an opportunity for notice and a
hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section.
(g) In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section concerning relief from
the stay of any act under subsection (a) of this section—
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of proof on the issue of the
debtor's equity in property; and
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof on all other issues.
(h) An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section
shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys* fees, and, in appropriate
circumstances, may recover punitive damages.
(Nov. 6, 1978, P. L. 95-598, Title I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2570; July 27, 1982, P. L. 97222, § 3, 96 Stat. 235; July 10, 1984, P. L. 98-353, Title HI, Subtitle A, § 304,
Subtitle C, § 363(b), Subtitle F, § 392, Subtitle H, § 441, 98 Stat. 352, 363, 365, 371;
Oct. 21, 1986, P. L. 99-509, Title V, Subtitle A, §5001, 100 Stat. 1911; Oct. 27,
1986, P.L. 99-554, Title II, Subtitles B, C, §§ 2570), 283(d) 100 Stat. 3115, 3116.)
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HISTORY: ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
References in text:
The "National Housing Act", referred to in this section, is Act June 27, 1934, ch
847, 48 Stat. 1246, which appears generally at 12 USCS §§ 1701 et seq. For full
classification of this Act, consult USCS Tables volumes.
Effective date of section:
Section 402(a) of Act Nov. 6, 1978, provided that this section "shall take effect
on October 1, 1979."
Amendments:
1982, Act July 27, 1982, in subsec. (a), in the introductory matter, inserted ", or
an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)),", and, in subsec (b), in the introductory
matter, inserted ", or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 US.C. 78eee(a)(3)),", and substituted para.
(6) for one which read: "under subsection (a)(7) of this section, of the setoff of
any mutual debt and claim that are commodity futures contracts, forward
commodity contracts, leverage transactions, options, warrants, rights to purchase
or sell commodity futures contracts or securities, or options to purchase or sell
commodities or securities;".
1984. Act July 10, 1984, in subsec. (a), in para. (1), inserted "action or", and in
para. (3), inserted "or to exercise control over property of the estate"; in subsec
(b), in para. (3), inserted "or to the extent that such act is accomplished within
the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A)", in para. (6), inserted "[,]financial institution," wherever appearing, [see Explanatory notes to this section],
inserted "or due from" and substituted "secure, or settle commodity contracts"
for "or secure commodity contracts", redesignated para. (7) as para. (8) and
added a new para. (7) and, in para. (8) as redesignated, deleted "or" following
the concluding semicolon, redesignated para. (8) as para. (9) and, in para. (9) as
redesignated, substituted ", or" for the concluding period, and added new para.
[(10)](9), and in para. (8) as redesignated, substituted "the" for "said", and
purported to delete "or" following "units;", redesignated para. (8) as para. (9),
and m para. [(10)](9) as so redesignated, substituted a semicolon for a concluding
period; and added para. [(11)](10); in subsec. (c)(2)(B), substituted "or" for
"and", in subsec. (d)(2), in the introductory matter, inserted "under subsection
(a) of this section", in subsec (e), inserted "the conclusion of, and substituted
two sentences beginning "The court shall order
" and "If the hearing
. . . ."for "If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing—
"(1) the court shall order such stay so continued if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the
final hearing under subsection (d) of this section, and
"(2) such final hearing shall be commenced within thirty days after such
preliminary hearing "
Such Act further in subsec. (0, substituted "Upon request of a party in interest,
the" for "The", and inserted "with or", and added subsec. (h).
1986. Act Oct. 21, 1986 (applicable only to petitions [sic] filed under § 362 after
August 1, 1986 and on or before December 31, 1989) replaced the period at the
end of para. (b)(ll) with a semicolon and added paras (b)(12) and (b)(13).
Act Oct. 27, 1986 (effective 30 days after enactment on 10/27/86, as provided by
§ 302(a) of such Act, which appears as 28 USCS § 581 note), in subsec. (b), in
para. (6), substituted ", financial institutions" for "financial institution," each
place it appears, in the first para. (9), deleted "or" following the semicolon,
redesignated the second para. (9) to be para. (10), and in para. (10), as so
redesignated, purported to substitute ", or" for the period; however, such
amendment was executed to insert "or" following the concluding semicolon to
conform to the probable intent of Congress, and redesignated former para. (10)
to be para. (11); and in subsec. (cX2)(C), inserted "12,".
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Other provisions:
Effective date of amendments made by Act July 10, 1984. Act July 10, 1984, P
L 98-353, Title III, Subtitle K, § 553(a), 98 Stat 392, which appears as 11
USCS § 101 note, provided that the amendments made to this section by such
Act "become effective to cases filed 90 days after the date of enactment" on July
10, 1984
Report and recommendations as to (b)(12) and (b)(13) maritime provisions: Act
Oct 21, 1986, P L 99-509, Title V, Subtitle A, § 5001, 100 Stat 1912 provides
"Before July 1, 1989, the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of
Commerce each shall submit a report to the Committees on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the
Committees on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Judiciary of the
Senate on the effects of this subsection together with any recommendations for
legislation "
Legislative History
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the
bankruptcy laws It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors It stops
all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions It permits the
debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of
thefinancialpressures that drove him into bankruptcy
The automatic stay also provides creditor protection Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's property
Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and
to the detriment of other creditors Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly
liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated equally A race of
diligence by creditors for the debtor's assets prevents that (H Rept No 95-595
to accompany H R 8200, 95th Cong , 1st Sess (1977) pp 340-344)
Subsection (a) defines the scope of the automatic stay, by listing the acts that are
stayed by the commencement of the case The commencement or continuation,
including the issuance of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the bankruptcy case is stayed under paragraph (1) The scope
of this paragraph is broad All proceedings are stayed, including arbitration,
license revocation, administrative, and judicial proceedings Proceedings in this
sense encompasses civil actions as well, and all proceedings even if they are not
before governmental tribunals
The provision in this first paragraph prohibiting the issuance of process is
designed to prevent the issuance of a wnt of execution by a judgment creditor of
the debtor to obtain property that was property of the debtor before the case, but
that was transferred, subject to the judgment lien, before the case Because the
other paragraphs of this subsection refer only to property of the estate or
property of the debtor, neither of which apply to this kind of transferred
property, they would not prohibit pursuit of the transferred property by issuance
of process Thus, the prohibition in this paragraph is included and the judgment
creditor is allowed to proceed by way of foreclosure against the property, but not
by a general wnt of execution (in the State court, or wherever the creditor
obtained the judgment) against the debtor and all of the debtor's property
The stay is not permanent There is adequate provision for relief from the stay
elsewhere in the section However, it is important that the trustee have an
opportunity to inventory the debtor's position before proceeding with the
administration of the case Undoubtedly the court will lift the stay for proceedings before specialized or nongovernmental tnbunals to allow those proceedings
to come to a conclusion Any party desinng to enforce an order in such a
proceeding would thereafter have to come before the bankruptcy court to collect
assets Nevertheless, it will often be more appropnate to permit proceedings to
continue in their place of ongm, when no great prejudice to the bankruptcy
estate would result, in order to leave the parties to their chosen forum and to
relieve the bankruptcy court from many duties that may be handled elsewhere
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(H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp.
340-344.)
Section 362(a)(1) of the House amendment adopts the provision contained in the
Senate amendment enjoining the commencement or continuation of a judicial,
administrative, or other proceeding to recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case. The provision is beneficial and
interacts with section 362(a)(6), which also covers assessment, to prevent harassment of the debtor with respect to pre-petition claims. (124 Cong. Rec. H 11093
(Sept. 28, 1978.).)
Paragraph (2) stays the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of
the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the bankruptcy
case. Thus, execution and levy against the debtors' prepetition property are
stayed, and attempts to collect a judgment from the debtor personally are stayed.
(H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp.
340-344.)
Paragraph (3) stays any act to obtain possession of property of the estate (that is,
property of the debtor as of the date of the filing of the petition) or property
from the estate (property over which the estate has control or possession). The
purpose of this provision is to prevent dismemberment of the estate. Liquidation
must proceed in an orderly fashion. Any distribution of property must be by the
trustee after he has had an opportunity to familiarize himself with the various
rights and interests involved and with the property available for distribution. (H.
Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340344.)
Paragraph (4) stays lien creation against property of the estate. Thus, taking
possession to perfect a lien or obtaining court process is prohibited. To permit
lien creation after bankruptcy would give certain creditors preferential treatment
by making them secured instead of unsecured. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.)
Paragraph (5) stays any act to create or enforce a lien against property of the
debtor, that is, most property that is acquired after the date of the filing of the
petition, property that is exempted, or property that does not pass to the estate,
to the extent that the lien secures a prepetition claim. Again, to permit
postbankruptcy lien creation or enforcement would permit certain creditors to
receive preferential treatment. It may also circumvent the debtors' discharge. (H.
Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340344.)
Paragraph (6) prevents creditors from attempting in any way to collect a
prepetition debt. Creditors in consumer cases occasionally telephone debtors to
encourage repayment in spite of bankruptcy. Inexperienced, frightened, or illcounseled debtors may succumb to suggestions to repay notwithstanding their
bankruptcy. This provision prevents evasion of the purpose of the bankruptcy
laws by sophisticated creditors. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.)
Paragraph (7) stays setoffs of mutual debts and credits between the debtor and
creditors. As with all other paragraphs of subsection (a), this paragraph does not
affect the right of creditors. It simply stays its enforcement pending an orderly
examination of the debtor's and creditors' rights. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to
accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. H977) pp.340-344.)
Section 362(a)(7) contains a provision contaii.ad in H.R. 8200 as passed by the
House. The differing provision in the Senate ai endment was rejected. It is not
possible that a debt owing to the debtor may be ^set against an interest in the
debtor. (124 Cong. Rec. H 11093, H 11093 (Sept. 2b, 1978).)
Section 362(a)(8) is new. The provision stays the comm:ncement or continuation
of any proceeding concerning the debtor before the U.S. Tix Court. (124 Cong.
Rec. H 11093 (Sept. 28, 1978).)
Subsection (b) lists five exceptions to the automatic stay. The effect of an
exception is not to make the action immune from injunction.
The court has ample other powers to stay actions not covered by the automatic
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stay. Section 105, of proposed title 11, derived from Bankruptcy Act §2a(15),
grants the power to issue orders neecssary or approriate [appropriate] to carry
out the provisions of title 11. The bankruptcy courts are brought within the
scope of the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1651 (1970), and are given the powers
of a court of law, equity, and admiralty (H.R. 8200, § 243(a), proposed 28
U.S.C 1481). Stays or injunctions issued under these other sections will not be
automatic upon the commencement of the case, but will be granted or issued
under the usual rules for the issuance of injunctions. By excepting an act or
action from the automatic stay, the bill simply requires that the trustee move the
court into action, rather than requiring the stayed party to request relief from
the stay. There are some actions, enumerated in the exceptions, that generally
should not be stayed automatically upon the commencement of the case, for
reasons of either policy or practicality. Thus, the court will have to determine on
a case-by-case basis whether a particular action which may be harming the estate
should be stayed.
With respect to stays issued under other powers, or the application of the
automatic stay, to governmental actions, this section and the other sections
mentioned are intended to be an express waiver of sovereign immunity of the
Federal government, and an assertion of the bankruptcy power over State
governments under the Supremacy Clause notwithstanding a State's sovereign
immunity. (H. Rept. No 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) pp. 340-344.)
The first exception is of criminal proceedings against the debtor. The bankruptcy
laws are not a haven for criminal offenders, but are designed to give relief from
financial over-extension. Thus, criminal actions and proceedings may proceed in
spite of bankruptcy. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.)
Paragraph (2) excepts from the stay the collection of alimony, maintenance or
support from property that is not property of the estate. This will include
property acquired after the commencement of the case, exempted property, and
property that does not pass to the estate. The automatic stay is one means of
protecting the debtor's discharge. Alimony, maintenance and support obligations
are excepted from discharge. Staying collection of them, when not to the
detriment of other creditors (because the collection effort is against property that
is not property of the estate), does not further that goal. Moreover, it could lead
to hardship on the part of the protected spouse or children. (H. Rept. No. 95595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.)
Paragraph (3) excepts any act to perfect an interest in property to the extent that
the trustee's rights and powers are limited under section 546(a) of the bankruptcy code. That section permits postpetition perfection of certain liens to be
effective against the trustee. If the act of perfection, such as filing, were stayed,
the section would be nullified. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.)
Paragraph (4) excepts commencement or continuation of actions and proceedings
by governmental units to enforce police or regulatory powers. Thus, where a
governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud,
environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the
action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay. Paragraph (5)
makes clear that the exception extends to permit an injunction and enforcement
of an injunction, and to permit the entry of a money judgment, but does not
extend to permit enforcement of a money judgment. Since the assets of the
debtor are in the possession and control of the bankruptcy court, and since they
constitute a fund out of which all creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by
a governmental unit of a money judgment would give it preferential treatment to
the detriment of all other creditors. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R.
8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.)
Section 362(b)(4) indicates that the stay under section 362(aXl) does not apply
to affect the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a
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governmental unit to enforce the governmental unit's police or regulatory power.
This section is intended to be given a narrow construction in order to permit
governmental units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and
not to apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest in
property of the debtor or property of the estate. (124 Cong. Rec. H 11092, H
11093 (Sept. 28, 1978).)
Paragraph (6) [of subsection (b)] excepts the setoff of any mutual debt and claim
for commodity transactions. (S. Rept. No. 95-989 to accompany S. 2266, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) pp. 52, 53, 55.)
Section 362(b)(6) of the House amendment adopts a provision contained in the
Senate amendment restricting the exception to the automatic stay with respect to
setoffs to permit only the setoff of mutual debts and claims. Traditionally, the
right of setoff has been limited to mutual debts and claims and the lack of the
clarifying term "mutual" in H.R. 8200 as passed by the House created an
unintentional ambiguity. (124 Cong. Rec. J 11092, H 11093 (Sept. 28, 1978).)
Mr. MATHIAS.
It is the distinguished Senator's understanding that the provisons of section
362(b)(6) of the bill before us will protect the right of a commodity broker,
forward contract merchant, or clearing organization to liquidate or transfer an
open commodity contract held or carried for a bankrupt pursuant to existing
contractual rights and that such right will not be subject to any stay sought to be
imposed under this act, State law or court order?
Mr. DeConcini. Yes. (124 Cong. Rec S 17434 (Oct. 6, 1978).)
Section 3(c) is intended to clarify that, despite the automatic stay of section
362(a), a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, or securities clearing agency may set off a claim for a margin or settlement payment
arising out of commodities contracts, forward contracts, or securities contract
against cash, securities or other property which it is holding to margin, guarantee, or secure such contracts, notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the party for
whose account such cash, securities, or property is held. This section does not
permit a setoff which would be unlawful under any applicable law or regulation
(H. Rept. No. 97-420 to accompany H.R. 4935, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1982) p. 3.)
Section 3(c) of H.R. 4935 would amend section 362(b)(6) of the code to clarify
that a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, or securities
clearing agency may set off a claim for a margin or settlement payment against
cash, securities, or other property which it is holding, notwithstanding the
bankruptcy of the party for whose account such cash, securities, or property is
held and despite the automatic stay of section 362(a). This means that if a
commodity or securities brokerage firm, forward contract merchant, commodity
clearing organization, or securities clearing agency has a claim for a margin or
settlement payment against the debtor arising, before or after the filing of the
petiton, out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts—
or the liquidation of those contracts—and holds cash, securities, or other
property with respect to the same or other commodity contracts, forward
contracts, or securities contracts, it would not be stayed from setting off that
claim against such cash, securities, or other property, or against any amount
with respect to such contracts that it would be required to pay. In the case of
forward contracts the net amount due to or owing from the debtor would be the
sum of the net amounts, if any, due or owing with respect to each such contract
of the debtor. This section would not permit a setoff that would be unlawful
under any applicable law or regulation.
Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I have a question regarding the scope of section
3(c) of H.R. 4935, which basically would amend section 362(b)(6) of the code to
exempt from the general stay of actions against a debtor the setoff of a claim
against the debtor for a margin or settlement payment arising from a commodity
contract, forward contract, or securities contract against cash, securities, or other
property held by a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, or stock
broker to margin, guarantee or secure other contracts of the debtor.
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The language of section 3(c) is more restrictive than that of section 25(bX3) of S.
983, the parallel provision of Senate bankruptcy technical amendments bill,
which would have exempted from the automatic stay the setoff of any "mutual
debt and claim regarding futures contracts, forward contracts and other specified
contracts. I understand that the purpose of the narrower language of section 3(c)
is to prevent setoffs for charges such as commissions, or by entities such as
banks, which are not necessary to achieve the market protection functions of
section 362(b)(6).
I too am concerned about achievement of these market protection functions.
Accordingly, my question is whether a settlement payment owed to a customer
with respect to a commodity contract, forward contract, or securities contract is
property held by a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, or stockbroker to guarantee or secure the customers other contracts within the meaning of
section 3(c), and may therefore be offset against a margin or settlement payment
owed by the customer with respect to that or another contract.
Mr. DOLE. Yes. (128 Cong. Rec. S 8132 S 8133 (July 13, 1982).)
Paragraph (7) [(8) of subsection (b)] excepts actions by the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development to foreclose or take possession in a case of a loan
insured under the National Housing Act. A general exception for such loans is
found in current sections 263 and 517, the exception allowed by this paragraph
is much more limited.
Upon the court's finding that the debtor has no equity in the property subject to
the stay and that the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization of
the debtor, the subsection requires the court grant relief from the stay. To aid in
this determination, guidelines are established where the property subject to the
stay is real property. An exception to "the necessary to an effective reorganization" requirement is made for real property on which no business is being
conducted other than operating the real property and activities incident thereto.
The intent of this exception is to reach the single-asset apartment type cases
which involve primarily tax-shelter investments and for which the bankruptcy
laws have provided a too facile method to relay conditions, but not the operating
shopping center and hotel cases where attempts at reorganization should be
permitted. Property in which the debtor has equity but which is not necessary to
an effective reorganization of the debtor should be sold under section 363.
Hearings under this subsection are given calendar priority to ensure that court
congestion will not unduly prejudice the rights of creditors who may be
obviously entitled to relief from the operation of the automatic stay. (S. Rept.
No. 95-989 to accompany S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) pp. 52, 53, 55.)
Section 362(b)(7) [(9)] of the House amendment permits the issuance of a notice
of tax deficiency. The House amendment rejects section 362(b)(7) in the Senate
amendment. It would have permitted a particular governmental unit to obtain a
pecuniary advantage without a hearing on the merits contrary to the exceptions
contained in sections 362(b)(4) and (5). (124 Cong. Rec. H 11092, H 11093
(Sept. 28, 1978).)
Subsection (c) of section 362 specifies the duration of the automatic stay.
Paragraph (1) terminates a stay of an act against property of the estate when the
property ceases to be property of the estate, such as by sale, abandonment, or
exemption. It does not terminate the stay against property of the debtor if the
property leaves the estate and goes to the debtor. Paragraph (2) terminates the
stay of any other act on the earliest of the time the case is closed, the time the
case is dismissed, or the time a discharge is granted or denied (unless the debtor
is a corporation or partnership in a chapter 7 case).
Subsection (c) governs automatic termination of the stay. (H. Rept. No. 95-595
to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.)
Subsections (d) through (g) govern termination of the stay by the court on the
request of a party in interest. Subsection (d) requires the court, on request of a
party in interest, to grant relief from the stay, such as by terminating, annulling,
modifying, or conditioning the stay, for cause. The lack of adequate protection of
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an interest in property of the party requesting relief from the stay is one cause
for relief, but is not the only cause. As noted above, a desire to permit an action
to proceed to completion in another tribunal may provide another cause. Other
causes might include the lack of any connection with or interference with the
pending bankruptcy case. For example, a divorce or child custody proceeding
involving the debtor may bear no relation to the bankruptcy case. In that case, it
should not be stayed. A probate proceeding in which the debtor is the executor
or administrator of another's estate usually will not be related to the bankruptcy
case, and should not be stayed. Generally, proceedings in which the debtor is a
fiduciary, or involving postpetition activities of the debtor, need not be stayed
because they bear no relationship to the purpose of the automatic stay, which is
debtor protection from his creditors. The facts of each request will determine
whether relief is appropriate under the circumstances. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to
accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.)
Section 362(d) of the House amendment represents a compromise between
comparable provisions in the House bill and Senate amendment. Under section
362(d)(1) of the House amendment, the court may terminate, annul, modify, or
condition the automatic stay for cause, including lack of adequate protection of
an interest in property of a secured party. It is anticipated that the Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure will provide that those hearings will receive priority on
the calendar. Under section 362(d)(2) the court may alternatively terminate,
annul, modify, or condition the automatic stay for cause including inadequate
protection for the creditor. The court shall grant relief from the stay if there is
no equity and it is not necessary to an effective reorganization of the debtor.
The latter requirement is contained in section 362(d)(2). This section is intended
to solve the problem of real property mortgage foreclosures of property where
the bankruptcy petition is filed on the eve of foreclosure. The section is not
intended to apply if the business of the debtor is managing or leasing real
property, such as a hotel operation, even though the debtor has no equity if the
property is necessary to an effective reorganization of the debtor. Similarly, if the
debtor does have an equity in the property, there is no requirement that the
property be sold under section 363 of title 11 as would have been required by the
Senate amendment. (124 Cong. Rec. H 11092, H 11093 (Sept. 28, 1978).)
Subsection (e) provides a protection for secured creditors that is not available
under present law. The subsection sets a time certain within which the bankruptcy court must rule on the adequacy of protection provided of the secured
creditor's interest. If the court does not rule within 30 days from a request for
relief from the stay, the stay is automatically terminated with respect to the
property in question. In order to accommodate more complex cases, the subsection permits the court to make a preliminary ruling after a preliminary hearing.
After a preliminary hearing, the court may continue the stay only if there is a
reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from the stay will prevail at
the final hearing. Because the stay is essentially an injunction, the three stages of
the stay may be analogized to the three stages of an injunction. The filing of the
petition which gives rise to the automatic stay is similar to a temporary
restraining order. The preliminary hearing is similar to the hearing on a
preliminary injunction, and the final hearing and order is similar to a permanent
injunction. The main difference lies in which party must bring the issue before
the court. While in the injunction setting, the party seeking the injunction must
prosecute the action, in proceedings for relief from the automatic stay, the
enjoined party must move. The difference does not, however, shift the burden of
proof. Subsection (g) leaves that burden on the party opposing relief from the
stay (that is, on the party seeking continuance of the injunction) on the issue of
adequate protection.
At the expedited hearing under subsection (e), and at all hearings on relief from
the stay, the only issue will be the claim of the creditor and the lack of adequate
protection or existence of other cause for relief from the stay. This hearing will
not be the appropriate time at which to bring in other issues, such as counterclaims against the creditor on largely unrelated matters. Those counterclaims are
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not to be handled in the summary fashion that the preliminary hearing under
this provision will be. Rather, they will be the subject of more complete
proceedings by the trustees to recover property of the estate or to object to the
allowance of a claim. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.)
Subsection (e) provides protection that is not always available under present law.
The subsection sets a time certain within which the bankruptcy court must rule
on the adequacy of protection provided for the secured creditor's interest. If the
court does not rule within 30 days from a request by motion for relief from the
stay, the stay is automatically terminated with respect to the property in
question. To accommodate more complex cases, the subsection permits the court
to make a preliminary ruling after a preliminary hearing. After a preliminary
hearing, the court may continue the stay only if there is a reasonable likelihood
that the party opposing relief from the stay will prevail at the final hearing.
Because the stay is essentially an injunction, the three stages of the stay may be
analogized to the three stages of an injunction. The filing of the petition which
gives rise to the automatic stay is similar to a temporary restraining order. The
preliminary hearing is similar to the hearing on a preliminary injunction, and the
final hearing and order are similar to the hearing and issuance or denial of a
permanent injunction. The main difference lies in which party must bring the
issue before the court. While in the injunction setting, the party seeking the
injunction must prosecute the action, in proceedings for relief from the automatic
stay, the enjoined party must move. The difference does not, however, shift the
burden of proof. Subsection (g) leaves that burden on the party opposing relief
from the stay (that is, on the party seeking continuance of the injunction) on the
issue of adequate protection and existence of an equity. It is not, however,
intended to be confined strictly to the constitutional requirement. This section
and the concept of adequate protection are based as much on policy grounds as
on constitutional grounds. Secured creditors should not be deprived of the benefit
of their bargain. There may be situations in bankruptcy where giving a secured
creditor an absolute right to his bargain may be impossible or seriously detrimental to the policy of the bankruptcy laws. Thus, this section recognizes the
availability of alternate means of protecting a secured creditor's interest where
such steps are a necessary part of the rehabilitative process. Though the creditor
might not be able to retain his lien upon the specific collateral held at the time of
filing, the purpose of the section is to insure that the secured creditor receives
the value for which he bargained.
The action commenced by the party seeking relief from the stay is referred to as
a motion to make it clear that at the expedited hearing under subsection (e), and
at hearings on relief from the stay, the only issue will be the lack of adequate
protection, the debtor's equity in the property, and the necessity of the property
to an effective reorganization of the debtor, or the existence of other cause for
relief from the stay. This hearing will not be the appropriate time at which to
bring in other issues, such as counterclaims against the creditor, which, although
relevant to the question of the amount of the debt, concern largely collateral or
unrelated matters. This approach is consistent with that taken in cases such as In
re Essex Properties, Ltd., 430 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D.Cal. 1977), that an action
seeking relief from the stay is not the assertion of a claim which would give rise
to the right or obligation to assert counterclaims. Those counterclaims are not to
be handled in the summary fashion that the preliminary hearing under this
provision will be. Rather, they will be the subject of more complete proceedings
by the trustee to recover property of the estate or to object to the allowance of a
claim. However, this would not preclude the party seeking continuance of the
stay from presenting evidence on the existence of claims which the court may
consider in exercising its discretion. What is precluded is a determination of such
collateral claims on the merits at the hearing. (S. Rept. No. 95-989 to accompany S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) pp. 52, 53, 55.)
Section 362(e) of the House amendment represents a modification of provisions

11 USCS § 362
92

BANKRUPTCY CODE
in H.R. 8200 as passed by the House and the Senate amendment to make clear
that a final hearing must be commenced within 30 days after a preliminary
hearing is held to determine whether a creditor will be entitled to relief from the
automatic stay. In order to insure that those hearings will in fact occur within
such 30-day period, it is anticipated that the rules of bankruptcy procedure
provide that such final hearings receive priority on the court calendar. (124
Cong. Rec. H 11092, H 11093 (Sept. 28, 1978).)
Subsection (f) permits ex parte relief from the stay in situations in which
irreparable damage might occur to the stayed party before there is opportunity
for notice and a hearing under the usual procedure. The Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure will provide for a hearing soon after the issuance of any ex parte
order under this subsection. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.)
Section 362(g) places the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in
collateral on the party requesting relief from the automatic stay and the burden
on other issues on the debtor. (124 Cong. Rec. H 11092, H 11093 (Sept. 28,
1978).)

11 USCS § 363. Use, sale, or lease of property
(a) In this section, "cash collateral" means cash, negotiable instruments, documents
of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in
which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest and includes
the proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits of property subject to a security
interest as provided in section 552(b) of this title [11 USCS § 552(b), whether
existing before or after the commencement of a case under this title [11 USCS
§§ 101 et seq.].
(b)(1) The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in
the ordinary course of business, property of the estate.
(2) If notification is required under subsection (a) of section 7A of the Clayton
Act (15 U.S.C. 18a) [15 USCS § 18a] in the case of a transaction under this
subsection, then—
(A) notwithstanding subsection (a) of such section, such notification shall be
given by the trustee; and
(B) notwithstanding subsection (b) of such section, the required waiting period
shall end on the tenth day after the date of the receipt of such notification,
unless the court, after notice and hearing, orders otherwise.
(c)(1) If the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated under section 721,
1108, 1304, 1203, or 1204 of this title [11 USCS §721, 1108, 1304, 1203, or
1204] and unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee may enter into transactions, including the sale or lease of property of the estate, in the ordinary course
of business, without notice or a hearing, and may use property of the estate in
the ordinary course of business without notice or a hearing.
(2) The trustee may not use, sell, or lease cash collateral under paragraph (1) of
this subsection unless—
(A) each entity that has an interest in such cash collateral consents; or
(B) the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use, sale, or lease in
accordance with the provisions of this section.
(3) Any hearing under paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection may be a preliminary
hearing or may be consolidated with a hearing under subsection (c) of this
section, but shall be scheduled in accordance with the needs of the debtor. If the
hearing under paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection is a preliminary hearing, the
court may authorize such use, sale, or lease only if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the trustee will prevail at the final hearing under subsection (e) of
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bility or ability, and does not prohibit imposition of requirements such as net
capital rules, if applied nondiscriminatorily.
In addition, the section is not exhaustive. The enumeration of various forms of
discrimination against former bankrupts is not intended to permit other forms of
discrimination. The courts have been developing the Perez rule. This section
permits further development to prohibit actions by governmental or quasi-governmental organizations that perform licensing functions, such as a State bar
association or a medical society, or by other organizations that can seriously
affect the debtors' livelihood or fresh start, such as exclusion from a union on the
basis of discharge of a debt to the union's credit union.
The effect of the section, and of further interpretations of the Perez rule, is to
strengthen the anti-reaffirmation policy found in section 524(b). Discrimination
based solely on nonpayment could encourage reaffirmations, contrary to the
expressed policy.
The section is not so broad as a comparable section proposed by the Bankruptcy
Commission, H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §4-508 (1975), which would have
extended the prohibition to any discrimination, even by private parties. Nevertheless, it is not limiting either, as noted. The courts will continue to mark the
contours of the anti-discrimination provision in pursuit of sound bankruptcy
policy. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) pp. 366, 367.)
SUBCHAPTER III—THE ESTATE
11 USCS § 541. Property of the estate
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title [11
USCS § 301, 302, or 303] creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the
following property, wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community property as
of the commencement of the case that is—
(A) the sole, equal, or joint management and control of the debtor; or
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or for both an allowable
claim against the debtor and an allowable claim against the debtor's spouse, to
the extent that such interest is so liable.
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section 329(b),
363(n), 543, 550, 553, or 723 of this title [11 USCS § 329(b), 363(n) 543, 550,
553, or 723].
(4) Any interest in property preserved for the benefit of or ordered transferred to
the estate under section 510(c) or 551 of this title [11 USCS § 510(c) or 551].
(5) Any interest in property that would have been property of the estate if such
interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date of the filing of the petition,
and that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after
such date—
(A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance;
(B) as a result of a property settlement agreement with the debtor's spouse, or
of an interlocutory or final divorce decree; or
(C) as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or of a death benefit plan.
(6) Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the
estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual
debtor after the commencement of the case.
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of
the case.
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USCS § 101 note, provided that the amendments made to this section by such
Act "become effective to cases filed 90 days after the date of enactment" on July
10, 1984.
Legislative History
Paragraph (6) [of § 547(c)] governs prepetition setoff. Setoff, even though
preferential, is protected if it occurred more than five days before the case, unless
it is a setoff under circumstances which would invalidate it under section 553. If
the setoff occurred within the five-day period, then it is avoidable only if the
trustee may use, sell, or lease the property so recovered.
This section preserves, with some changes, the right of setoff in bankruptcy cases
now found in section 68 of the Bankruptcy Act. One exception to the right is the
automatic stay, discussed in connection with proposed 11 U.S.C. 362. Another is
the right of the trustee to use property under section 363 that is subject to a
right of setoff.
The section states that the right of setoff is unaffected by the bankruptcy code
except to the extent that the creditor's claim is disallowed, the creditor acquired
(other than from the debtor) the claim during the 90 days preceding the case
while the debtor was insolvent, the debt being offset was incurred for the purpose
of obtaining a right of setoff, while the debtor was insolvent and during the 90day prebankruptcy period, or the creditor improved his position in the 90-day
period (similar to the improvement in position test found in the preference
section, 547(c)(5)). Only the last exception is an addition to current law.
As under section 547(f), the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent during
the 90 days before the case. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 374, 377.)
Section 547(c)(6) of the House bill is deleted and is treated in a different fashion
in section 553 of the House amendment.
Section 553 of the House amendment is derived from a similar provision
contained in the Senate amendment, but is modified to clarify application of a
two-point test with respect to set offs. (124 Cong. Rec. H 11097 (Sept. 28,
1978).)
11 USCS § 554.

Abandonment of property of the estate

(a) After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to
the estate.
(b) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may
order the trustee to abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the
estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.
(c) Unless the court orders otherwise, any property scheduled under section 521(1)
of this title [11 USCS § 521(1)] not otherwise administered at the time of the closing
of a case is abandoned to the debtor and administered for purposes of section 350 of
this title [11 USCS §350].
(d) Unless the court orders otherwise, property of the estate that is not abandoned
under this section and that is not administered in the case remains property of the
estate.
(Nov. 6, 1978, P. L. 95-598, Title I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2603; July 10, 1984, P. L. 98353, Title III, Subtitle H, § 468, 98 Stat. 380; Oct. 27, 1986, P.L. 99-554, Title II,
Subtitle C, § 283(p), 100 Stat. 3118.)

11 USCS § 554
214

BANKRUPTCY CODE
HISTORY: ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Effective date of section:
Section 402(a) of Act Nov. 6, 1978, provided that this section "shall take effect
on October 1, 1979.".
Amendments:
1984. Act July 10, 1984, in subsecs. (a) and (b), inserted "and benefit";
substituted subsec. (c) for one which read: "Unless the court orders otherwise,
any property that is scheduled under section 521(1) of this title and that is not
administered before a case is closed under section 350 of this title is deemed
abandoned."; and, in subsec. (d), deleted "section (a) or (b) of* preceding "this
section".
1986. Act Oct. 27, 1986 (effective 30 days after enactment on 10/27/86, as
provided by § 302(a) of such Act, which appears as 28 USCS §581 note), in
subsec. (c), substituted "521(1)" for "521(a)(1)".
Other provisions:
Effective date of amendments made by Act July 10, 1984. Act July 10, 1984, P.
L. 98-353, Title III, Subtitle K, § 553(a), 98 Stat. 392, which appears as 11
USCS § 101 note, provided that the amendments made to this section by such
Act "become effective to cases filed 90 days after the date of enactment" on July
10, 1984.
Legislative History
This section authorizes the court to authorize the trustee to abandon any
property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate. Abandonment may be to any party with a possessory
interest in the property abandoned. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R.
8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) p. 377.)
In order to aid administration of the case, subsection (b) deems the court to have
authorized abandonment of any property that is scheduled under section 521(1)
and that is not administered before the case is closed. That property is deemed
abandoned to the debtor. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) p. 377.)
Section 554(b) is new and permits a party in interest to request the court to
order the trustee to abandon property of the estate that is burdensome to the
estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate. (124 Cong. Rec. H 11098
(Sept. 28, 1978).)
Subsection (c) specifies that if property is neither abandoned nor administered it
remains property of the estate. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200,
95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977) p. 377.)
11 USCS § 555. Contractual right to liquidate a securities contract
"The exercise of a contractual right of a stockbroker, financial institution, or
securities clearing agency to cause the liquidation of a securities contract, as defined
in section 741(7) [11 USCS § 741(7)], because of a condition of the kind specified in
section 365(e)(1) of this title [11 USCS § 365(e)(1)] shall not be stayed, avoided, or
Dtherwise limited by operation of any provision of this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et
seq.] or by order of a court or administrative agency in any proceeding under this
title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.] unless such order is authorized under the provisions
of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.) [15
USCS §§ 78aaa et seq.] or any statute administered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. As used in this section, the term "contractual right" includes a right
set forth in a rule or bylaw of a national securities exchange, a national securities
association, or a securities clearing agency.
(July 27, 1982, P. L. 97-222, § 6(a), 96 Stat. 236; July 10, 1984, P. L. 98-353, Title
III, Subtitle H, § 469, 98 Stat. 380.)
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28 USCS § 2409a, n 2
matter jurisdiction. Buchlcr v United States
(1974, DC Cal) 384 F Supp 709.
28 USCS § 2409a does not confer jurisdiction
on federal courts; jurisdiction over quiet title
action involving United States is provided specifically by 28 USCS § 1346(0- Morrison v Morrison (1976, DC Tex) 408 F Supp 315.
After United States disclaimed all interest in
land, it was inappropriate for Federal District
Court to retain jurisdiction of quiet title action,
and action was dismissed pursuant to 28 USCS
§ 2409a; court could not retain jurisdiction on
theory of pendent jurisdiction. W. H. Pugh Coal
Co. v United States (1976, DC Wis) 418 F Supp
538.
Annotations:
Scope of Federal District Court's jurisdiction
under 28 USCS §§ 1347, 2409, over suits by
tenant in common or joint tenant for partition of
lands where United States is one of tenants in
common or joint tenants. 29 ALR Fed 571.
3. Counterclaim
Argument that since term "party defendant"
is used in 28 USCS § 2409a, defendant can only
present quiet title action via complaint and not
by counterclaim was wholly without merit.
United States v Phillips (1973, DC Neb) 362 F
Supp 462.
4. Disclaimer
Federal District Court, pursuant to 28 USCS
§ 2409a(d), confirmed disclaimer of United States
in view of quitclaim deed which effectively conveyed interest of United States in property in
question to state of Wisconsin. W. H. Pugh Coal
Co. v United States (1976, DC Wis) 418 F Supp
538.
5. Equitable defenses against United States
Contention that Congress intended by enactment of 28 USCS § 2409a to expose Government
to doctrines of estoppel and laches was rejected.
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Wackerii v Morton (1975, DC Idaho) 390 F
Supp 962.
6. Limitations period
Plaintiffs who did not know of government's
claim to land prior to 1962, and who amended
their complaint to bring it within terms of 28
USCS § 2409a in March, 1973 were not barred
from bringing action by 12-year limitations period of § 2409a. Wackerii v Morton (1975, DC
Idaho) 390 F Supp 962.
12-year limitations bar of 28 USCS § 2409a(f)
begins to run on date when claim of United
States became known or should have become
known, and not on later date when statute was
passed. Hatter v United States (1975, DC Cal)
402 F Supp 1192.
7. —Nature of claim asserted
For purposes of limitations period, 28 USCS
§ 24O9a(0 makes no distinction between legal or
equitable claims but speaks only of disputes in
title to real property in which United States
claims interest. Hatter v United States (1975,
DC Cal) 402 F Supp 1192.
8. Sufficiency of complaint
Complaint under 28 USCS § 2409a is insufficient and will be dismissed unless it states with
particularity nature of plaintiffs' right, title or
interest, circumstances under which land was
acquired, right, title or interest claimed by
United States, and date on which plaintiffs or
their predecessors in interest knew or should
have known of claims of United States. Buchler
v United States (1974, DC Cal) 384 F Supp 709.
Complaint failed to state claim upon which
relief might be granted pursuant to 28 USCS
§ 2409a, where complaint asserted that cloud
upon title to unimproved realty was imposed by
designation of lands to be adjacent lands within
wild river area and by institution of eminent
domain proceedings to acquire scenic easements
over portions of lands. Middlefork Ranch, Inc. v
Butz (1975, DC Idaho) 393 F Supp 624.

§ 2410. Actions affecting property on which United States has lien
(a) Under the conditions prescribed in this section and section 1444 of this
title [28 USCS § 1444] for the protection of the United States, the United
States may be named a party in any civil action or suit in any district
court, or in any State court having jurisdiction of the subject matter—
(1) to quiet title to,
(2) to foreclose a mortgage or other lien upon,
(3) to partition,
(4) to condemn, or
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(5) of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader with respect to,
real or personal property on which the United States has or claims a
mortgage or other lien.
(b) The complaint or pleading shall set forth with particularity the nature
of the interest or lien of the United States. In actions or suits involving
liens arising under the internal revenue laws, the complaint or pleading
shall include the name and address of the taxpayer whose liability created
the lien and, if a notice of the tax hen was filed, the identity of the internal
revenue office which filed the notice, and the date and place such notice of
lien was filed. In actions in the State courts service upon the United States
shall be made by serving the process of the court with a copy of the
complaint upon the United States attorney for the district in which the
action is brought or upon an assistant United States attorney or clerical
employee designated by the United States attorney in writing filed with the
clerk of the court in which the action is brought and by sending copies of
the process and complaint, by registered mail, or by certified mail, to the
Attorney General of the United States at Washington, District of Columbia. In such actions the United States may appear and answer, plead or
demur within sixty days after such service or such further time as the
court may allow.
(c) A judgment or decree in such action or suit shall have the same effect
respecting the discharge of the property from the mortgage or other lien
held by the United States as may be provided with respect to such matters
by the local law of the place where the court is situated. However, an
action to foreclose a mortgage or other lien, naming the United States as a
party under this section, must seek judicial sale. A sale to satisfy a hen
inferior to one of the United States shall be made subject to and without
disturbing the lien of the United States, unless the United States consents
that the property may be sold free of its lien and the proceeds divided as
the parties may be entitled. Where a sale of real estate is made to satisfy a
lien prior to that of the United States, the United States shall have one
year from the date of sale within which to redeem, except that with respect
to a lien arising under the internal revenue laws the period shall be 120
days or the period allowable for redemption under State law, whichever is
longer, and in any case in which, under the provisions of section 505 of the
Housing Act of 1950, as amended (12 U.S.C 1701k) [12 USCS § 1701k],
and subsection (d) of section 1820 of title 38 of the United States Code [38
USCS § 1820], the right to redeem does not arise, there shall be no right of
redemption. In any case where the debt owing the United States is due, the
United States may ask, by way of affirmative relief, for the foreclosure of
its own lien and where property is sold to satisfy a first hen held by the
United States, the United States may bid at the sale such sum, not
exceeding the amount of its claim with expenses of sale, as may be directed
by the head (or his delegate) of the department or agency of the United
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States which has charge of the administration of the laws in respect to
which the claim of the United States arises.
(d) In any case in which the United States redeems real property under
this section or section 7425 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26
USCS § 7425], the amount to be paid for such property shall be the sum
of—
(1) the actual amount paid by the purchaser at such sale (which, in the
case of a purchaser who is the holder of the lien being foreclosed, shall
include the amount of the obligation secured by such lien to the extent
satisfied by reason of such sale),
(2) interest on the amount paid (as determined under paragraph (1)) at 6
percent per annum from the date of such sale, and
(3) the amount (if any) equal to the excess of (A) the expenses
necessarily incurred in connection with such property, over (B) the
income from such property plus (to the extent such property is used by
the purchaser) a reasonable rental value of such property.
(e) Whenever any person has a lien upon any real or personal property,
duly recorded in the jurisdiction in which the property is located, and a
junior lien, other than a tax lien, in favor of the United States attaches to
such property, such person may make a written request to the officer
charged with the administration of the laws in respect of which the lien of
the United States arises, to have the same extinguished. If after appropriate
investigation, it appears to such officer that the proceeds from the sale of
the property would be insufficient to wholly or partly satisfy the lien of the
United States, or that the claim of the United States has been satisfied or
by lapse of time or otherwise has become unenforceable, such officer shall
so report to the Comptroller General who may issue a certificate releasing
the property from such lien.
(June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 972; May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 119, 63
Stat 105; July 7, 1958, P. L. 85-508, § 12(h), 72 Stat. 348; June 11, 1960,
P. L. 85-507, § 1(20), 74 Stat. 201; Nov. 2, 1966, P. L. 89-719, Title II,
§201, 80 Stat. 1147.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Prior law and revision:
This section is based on Act Mar. 4, 1931, c. 515, §§ 1, 2, 4, 5, 46 Stat.
1528, 1529; May 17, 1932, c. 190, 47 Stat. 158; June 25, 1936, c. 804,
49 Stat. 1921; June 6, 1940, c. 242, 54 Stat. 234; Dec. 2, 1942, c. 656,
§§ 1-3, 56 Stat. 1026 (§§ 901, 902, 904, and 905 of former Title 28).
Provisions including the districts of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and the
District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, in
former 28 USCS § 901 were omitted as covered by "any district court."
See 28 USCS §451. Provisions in former 28 USCS §902 relating to
process were omitted as covered by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
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Amendments (with effective dates):
1949. Act May 24, 1949 inserted the second [later third] sentence of
subsec. (b) and "In such actions" and "such" preceding "service" in
the third [later fourth] sentence.
1958. Act July 7, 1958 (effective 1/3/59, by Proc. No. 3269, 24 Fed.
Reg. 81, 73 Stat. c. 16, as required by §§ 1 and 8(c) of P. L. 85-508).
Sec. 12(h) deleted "including the District Court for the Territory of
Alaska," following "district court," in subsec. (a).
1960. Act June 11, 1960, inserted "or by certified mail," in subsec. (b).
1966. Act Nov. 2, 1966, substituted the dash and all that follows it for
", to quiet title to or for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien
upon real or personal property on which the United States has or
claims a mortgage or other lien." in subsec. (a); inserted "or pleading"
and the second sentence of subsec. (b); substituted "judgment or
decree" for "judicial sale" and "the mortgage or other lien" for "liens
and encumbrances", added the second sentence and the exception in
the fourth sentence, and inserted "(or his delegate)" in the last sentence
of subsec. (c); added subsec. (d); and redesignated former subsec. (d) to
be(e).
CROSS REFERENCES
Interpleader, generally, 28 USCS §§ 1335, 1397, 2361.
Removal of actions brought under 28 USCS § 2410 from state court to
federal court, 28 USCS § 1444.
This section referred to in 12 USCS § 1071k; 26 USCS §§ 7424, 7425, 7810;
28 USCS § 1444; 38 USCS § 1820.
RESEARCH GUIDE
Am Jur.
32 Am Jur 2d, Federal Practice and Procedure § 482.
35 Am Jur 2d, Federal Tax Enforcement §§ 64, 65.
47 Am Jur 2d, Judicial Sales §§ 137, 270, 271, 335, 336, 344, 348.
55 Am Jur 2d, Mortgages §§ 9, 873, 890, 891.
77 Am Jur 2d, United States § 122.
Forms:
10 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Judicial and Execution Sales § 158:52.
11 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev ed), Federal Practice and Procedure,
Form 1441.
11 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev ed), Federal Tax Enforcement, Form
21.
18 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev ed), Mortgages, Form 154.
Annotations:
Construction and application of statute (28 USC § 2410(a)(c)) dealing
with actions affecting property on which the United States has a lien. 5
L Ed 2d 867.
When period for filing petition for removal of civil action from State
Court to Federal District Court begins to run under 28 USCS
§ 1446(b). 16 ALR Fed 287.
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Right to attack merits of assessment, in proceeding under 26 USC
§ 7403 to enforce, or under 28 USC § 2410 to discharge, federal tax
lien. 100 ALR2d 869.
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
I. IN GENERAL (notes 1-8)
II. APPLICATION TO PARTICULAR
ACTIONS
A. Actions to Quiet Title [28 USCS
§ 24lO(aXl)] (notes 9-13)
B. Actions to Foreclose Mortgage or
Other
Lien
[28
USCS
§ 24t0(aX2)] (notes 14-19)
C. Interpleader Actions [28 USCS
§ 2410(a)(5)] (notes 20, 21)
D. Actions Involving Tax Liens (notes
22-31)
III. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(notes 32-37)
1. IN GENERAL
Generally
Purpose
Waiver of immunity
Construction, generally
Interests of United States subject to adjudication
6. Establishment of lien priorities
7. Application of state law
8. Administrative waiver of liens [28 USCS
§ 2410(e)]

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

II. APPLICATION TO PARTICULAR
ACTIONS
A. Actions to Quiet Title [28 USCS § 2410(a)(1)]
9. Generally
10. When action will not lie
11. Judgment liens
12. Tax liens
13. Defective title
B. Actions to Foreclose Mortgage or Other Lien
[28 USCS § 2410(aX2)]
14. When action will lie
15. Effect of junior federal lien
l^. FoTtclo&urc salt.
17. Redemption, generally [28 USCS § 2410(c)]
18. —Payment [28 USCS § 2410(d)]
19. —Credit of lienor's account
C Interpleader Actions [28 USCS § 2410(aX5)]
20. Generally
21. When action will lie
D. Actions Involving Tax Liens
22. Generally
23. Attack on validity of lien, generally

24. —Determination of title against which lien
asserted
25. Attack on validity of assessment
26. Attack on enforcement of lien
27. Standing to attack
28. Resolution of conflicting tax liens
29. Foreclosure of state tax liens
30. Subrogation to tax lien
31. Tax sales
III. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
32. Jurisdiction of District Court, generally
33. —Removal
34. Pleading
35. Joinder
36. Stay of proceedings
37. Effect of judgment
I. IN GENERAL
1. Generally
Congress has power to establish rules governing state-created property rights in so far as
these rights affect property rights of United
States. United States v John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. (1960) 364 US 301, 5 L Ed 2d 1, 81 S
Ctl.
28 USCS §2410 provides, inter alia, that
United States may be named as party in state
court civil action involving adjudication of lien
claims, including those of United States. United
States v Hunt (1975, CA10 Wyo) 513 F2d 129.
1. Purpose
Predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 was limited in
purpose and application to situations involving
quieting of title or foreclosing or mortgages or
other hens on real or personal property, and
clearing real estate tides of questionable or valueless government liens. Schmitz v Societe Interp o l a t e , ;V&&, DC DvsX 0$> 149 F Swp^ 751,
cert den 387 US 908, 18 L Ed 2d 626, 87 S Q
1684.
28 USCS § 2410(a) was enacted for threefold
purpose: (1) to permit joinder where lien of
United States was junior to that foreclosed, (2)
to permit inquiry by junior lienor into procedural irregularities of United States lien, but not
underlying assessment itself, and, (3) to permit
discharge of United States liens that have been
eliminated, but not yet canceled. Shaw v United
States (1970, DC Vt) 321 F Supp 1267.

310

28 USCS § 2410, n 5

US AS PARTY
Purpose of predecessor of 28 USCS §2410
was to waive federal government's sovereign
immunity from suit in type of cases to which it
refers and to authorize suit to be brought against
United States Lavenburg v Universal Sportweai
(1950) 198 Misc 318, 98 NYS2d 160

United States v Brosnan (1960) 363 US 237, 4 L
Ed 2d 1192, 80 SCt 1108
28 USCS § 2410, as waiver of sovereign immunity of United States, must be strictly construed
Haggard v Lancaster (1970, DC Miss) 320 F
Supp 1252

3. Waiver of immunity
Purpose of predecessor of 28 USCS §2410
was merely to waive sovereign immunity from
suit in certain types of cases, not to confer
jurisdiction on courts to hear and determine
such cases in ordinary sense Wells v Long
(1947, CA9 Idaho) 162 F2d 842
Predecessor of 28 USCS §2410 constituted
mere waiver of immunity by United States, and
its consent to be sued in actions within scope of
such section Seattle Asso of Credit Men v
United States (1957, CA9 Wash) 240 F2d 906,
United States v Cless (1958, CA3 Pa) 254 F2d
590; Remis v United States (1960, CA1 Mass)
273 F2d 293
By successful moving SOT dismissal as to it
on grounds of sovereign immunity, United States
indicated that it had or claimed no hen upon
fund which was subject of litigation, within
purview of predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 Bank
of Hawau v Benchwick (1966, DC Hawaii) 249
F Supp 74
Government waives its sovereign immunity
under 28 USCS § 2410 in those suits which seek
to determine relative position of government hen
on property, as against other lienors, and those
suits which question validity of hen in reference
to compliance or noncompliance with statutory
and constitutional requirements of due process
Yannicelli v Nash (1973, DC NJ) 354 F Supp
143
28 USCS § 2410 waives sovereign immunity of
United States where Government is named as
party in civil action to quiet title to real or
personal property on which United States "has
or claims a mortgage or other hen", § 2410 is
not jurisdictional grant Globe Products Corp v
United States (1974, DC Md) 386 F Supp 319
Predecessor to 28 USCS §2410 did not include consent of United States to be sued where
United States was claiming title and not hen
Sissman v Chicago Title & Trust Co (1941) 375
111 514, 32 NE2d 132

5. Interests of United States subject to adjudication
Predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 did not apply
whefe United States claimed absolute title to real
property involved Riordan v Ferguson (1945,
CA2 NY) 147 F2d 983, Bertie's Apple Valley
Farms v United States (1973, CA9 Idaho) 476
F2d 291, Wells v Long (1946, DC Idaho) 68 F
Supp 671, affd (CA9 Idaho) 162 F2d 842, Hull v
Tollefson (1956, DC ND) 138 F Supp 315,
Brown v Johnson (1974, DC Tex) 373 F Supp
973
Predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 did not authorize action brought for purpose of terminating
consent agreement Ford Bros & Co v Eddington Dtfkfflmg Co (TO&, E>C ?a) 30 ? Supp 1M
Provisions of predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410
did not authonze suit to set aside pnvate sale by
pnvate party, alleged to have been authorized by
Internal Revenue Service, with understanding
that no bid would be accepted unless approved
by Internal Revenue Service, such action was not
withm actions named for which immunity was
waived by 28 USCS § 2410 Baumohl v Columbia Jewelry Co (1955, DC Md) 127 F Supp 865
Action instituted by plaintiff against United
States under predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 to
recover sum of money which allegedly was
wrongfully given by third party to collector of
internal revenue, and thereafter placed in United
States Treasury at time when plaintiff possessed
hen on such fund, superior to tax hen urged by
collector in gaining possession of money, was not
action "affecting property on which United
States has a hen" as contemplated by predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410(a) Tn-State Ins Co v
United States (1955, DC Okla) 129 F Supp 115
Provisions of former 28 USCS § 2410 did not
apply to suit by plaintiff to restrain government
from collecting penalties for violations of acts of
Congress fixing wheat quotas, even though statute provided for hen upon entire crop of wheat
produced on farm for amount of penalty for
excess grown Shinaberry v United States (1956,
DC Mich) 142 F Supp 413, affd (CA6 Mich) 242
F2d 758, cert den 353 US 976, 1 L Ed 2d 1137,
77 S Ct 1060
Absent its consent to be sued, District Court
did not have jurisdiction over United States in
action for specific performance of agreement
between plaintiffs and certain of defendants for

4. Construction, generally
Both 26 USCS §7424, under which pnvate
lienor may file petition in federal District Court
for leave to file action for final determination of
all claims to or hens upon property to which
federal tax hen has attached, and predecessor of
28 USCS § 2410 are purely permissive in tenor
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sale of real estate, on which it was alleged that
agency of United States held mortgage. Shaw v
Rippel (1963, DC 111) 224 F Supp 77.
Predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 applied only
to suits relating to government liens, and did not
apply to suit against United States in which it
was alleged in complaint that United States had
attempted condemnation of land in which plaintiffs owned mineral interests and that condemnation proceedings did not vest title to minerals in
United States, but that United States, notwithstanding lack of title, committed trespasses upon
mineral interests. Stewart v United States (1957,
CA5 Tex) 242 F2d 49.
Former 28 USCS § 2410 did not include situations where United States claims title interest, as
distinguished from lien interest; court would not
extend meaning of former § 2410 so as to hold
that Congress consented to suit against United
States in such situation. Zager v United States
(1966, DC Wis) 256 F Supp 396.
Funds deposited as bail for criminal defendant
are not subject to lien of government so as to
subject government to action under predecessor
of 28 USCS §2410; if, upon final determination
of criminal case, fine results as to defendant,
government may perfect its lien to enforce criminal fine as in civil judgment. Bank of Hawaii v
Benchwick (1966, DC Hawaii) 249 F Supp 74.
28 USCS § 2410, permitting United States to
assert its interest in state proceeding, speaks only
to lien interest. Isham v Blount (1974, DC Tenn)
373 F Supp 1376.
6. Establishment of lien priorities
Under ordinary circumstances, validity of
county tax foreclosure proceeding would be governed by state law, but, where federal lien is
involved and action is brought under federal
statute, decision of United States courts must
govern; thus, court must hold that earlier federal
tax lien is superior to later county tax lien,
although state law provides that county tax liens
are superior to all liens prior in time. United
States v Howard (1966, DC Or) 254 F Supp 499.
In action in which jurisdiction is predicated on
28 USCS §2410, federal rule for determining
relative priority between federal lien and statecreated lien is "first in time, first in right."
Kimbeil Foods, Inc. v Republic Nat. Bank
(1975, DC Tex) 401 F Supp 316.
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mortgage, is entitled to payment of its claims in
full upon redemption by mortgagor or only to
such debts as have been declared liens by state
courts. United States v John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. (1960) 364 US 301, 5 L Ed 2d 1, 81 S
a i.
8. Administrative waiver of liens [28 USCS
§ 2410(e)]

28 USCS § 2410(e) waives United States privileges concerning actions affecting property on
which United States has lien. United States v
Deya (1974, DC Puerto Rico) 369 F Supp 1113.
H. APPLICATION TO PARTICULAR
ACTIONS
A. Actions to Quiet Tide [28 USCS
§ 2410UXD]
9. Generally
Jurisdiction conferred by former 28 USCS
§2410 was not dependent upon relief sought;
thus, in action to quiet title, it was not necessary
to seek sale of property in order to vest court
with jurisdiction over United States. United
States v Morrison (1957, CA5 Tex) 247 F2d 285.
Action to quiet title, where delinquent taxpayer's state liquor license was levied upon and sold
under federal tax lien, is not undermined by fact
that license is personal rather than real property;
although suits to quiet title traditionally involved
real property, where action is governed by federal rather than state law, 28 USCS §2410
contemplates actions to quiet title to personalty
on which United States has or claims hen. Aqua
Bar & Lounge, Inc. v United States Dept. of
Treasury Internal Revenue Service (1976, CA3)
539 F2d 935.
In context of 28 USCS § 2410, words "quiet
title" are not used in limited sense. Law v
United States Dept. of Agriculture (1973, DC
Ga) 366 F Supp 1233.
10. When action will not lie
Where United States claimed title to property
rather than mortgage or other lien interest
therein, 28 USCS § 2410 did not authorize suit
against United States in quiet title action. Bertie's Apple Valley Farms v United States (1973,
CA9 Idaho) 476 F2d 291.
Proceeding to enforce attorney's lien for fee
was not proceeding to quiet title or for foreclosure of mortgage or other lien upon real or
personal property within contemplation of former 28 USCS §2410. Lavenburg v Universal
Sportswear, Inc. (1950, DC NY) 92 F Supp 473.
Former 28 USCS § 2410 did not waive immunity of United States in action to quiet title

7. Application of state law
Law of state where property is situated controls question whether United States, after having been joined under former 28 USCS § 2410 in
action brought in state court for foreclosure of
property on which United States claims junior
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where record title is vested in United States.
Hull v Tollefson (1956, DC ND) 138 F Supp
315.
Action seeking to restrain government from
collecting penalties for violation of wheat quota
is not action to quiet title to wheat, even though
government has asserted lien on wheat, and
former 28 USCS § 2410 does not confer government's consent to be sued in such action. Shinaberry v United States (1956, DC Mich) 142 F
Supp 413, affd (CA6 Mich) 242 F2d 758, cert
den 353 US 976, 1 L Ed 2d 1137, 77 S Ct 1060.
Action for "general determination'* of water
rights under state law, in which governmental
agencies of United States were named as claimants to water involved, was not type of proceeding which was within original jurisdiction of
District Court under former 28 USCS § 2410(a),
even though proceeding partook of nature of suit
to quiet title. Re Green River Drainage Area
(1956, DC Utah) 147 F Supp 127.
Suit characterized as one for injunctive relief,
can nevertheless be in nature of suit to quiet
title, and thus, be maintained under 28 USCS
§2410; however, United States could not be
made party to action under 28 USCS
§2410(aXl) or (2), where interest of United
States in insuring a low income housing project
could not be classified as "lien" within 28 USCS
§ 2410(aX2) and thus not removable under 28
USCS § 1440. Haggard v Lancaster (1970, DC
Miss) 320 F Supp 1252.
11. Judgment liens
Surviving children of intestate judgment debtors may maintain action under 28 USCS § 2410
against United States, judgment creditor, to quiet
title to real property held by parents, where
United States allowed judgment lien to become
dormant under state law, by failing to cause
execution to issue within time provided therefor;
judgment in favor of United States does not
create such "interest" in real property as to
preclude action against it under 28 USCS § 2410,
as interest resulting from judgment is lien. Matthews v Heirs, Exrs., Admrs., Devisees, Trustees
& Assigns of Matthews (1974, DC Okla) 378 F
Supp 693.
12. Tax liens
Federal District Court, as jurisdictional prerequisite in suit to quiet title from federal tax lien,
need not order foreclosure. United States v Morrison (1957, CA5 Tex) 247 F2d 285.
State court had jurisdiction of action against
United States to quiet title to land conveyed to
plaintiff wife by taxpayer husband some 2 years
prior to filing of collector's notice of tax lien
against husband; and provisions of Internal Rev-

enue Code of 1939, requiring consent of Commissioner or federal District Court as condition
precedent to maintaining quiet title action
against claimed tax lien of United States, was
not applicable. Smith v United States (1958,
CA6 Ohio) 254 F2d 865.
Words "quiet title" used in former 28 USCS
§ 2410(a), included suit to remove cloud on
plaintiff's title arising because of tax lien claimed
by government. United States v Coson (1961,
CA9 Cal) 286 F2d 453.
Action to quiet title under 28 USCS § 2410 is
proper proceeding to be brought by delinquent
taxpayer, whose state liquor license has been
levied upon and sold under federal tax lien.
Aqua Bar & Lounge, Inc. v United States Dept.
of Treasury Internal Revenue Service (1976,
CA3) 539 F2d 935.
Although labeled "Petition to Quiet Title",
complaint which, in effect, merely sought to
enjoin United States from collecting taxes (complaint deviating from procedures set forth by
Congress with respect to refund of taxes), was
not action within contemplation of former 28
USCS §2410. Viviano v United States (1952,
DC Mich) 105 F Supp 312.
Suit brought by husband and wife to quiet title
to properties owned by them as estates by entireties, upon which government asserted tax lien,
was subject to provisions of former 28 USCS
§2410. Bernstein v United States (1952, DC
Mo) 106 F Supp 233.
Purchasers of real property who overlooked
federal tax liens duly filed for record, but instead
relied upon grantor's affidavit that property was
free of liens, could not maintain action to quiet
title against United States. Pipola v Chicco
(1959, DC NY) 169 F Supp 229, mod on other
grounds (CA2 NY) 274 F2d 909 (ovrld on other
grounds United States v O'Connor (CA2 NY)
291 F2d 520, 100 ALR2d 858).
Federal District Court had jurisdiction of action by beneficiary praying that court order and
direct insurance company pay specified sum of
money and interest from date obligation accrued
in favor of plaintiff and to quiet title to proceeds
of life insurance policy as against alleged liens of
United States and District Director of Internal
Revenue. Guttman v United States (1961, DC
NY) 196 F Supp 384.
13. Defective title
Plaintiff in action against United States to
quiet title could not prevail under 28 USCS
§ 2410 where land in question was never conveyed to plaintiffs predecessor in interest. Gendron v United States (1974, DC Cal) 402 F Supp
46, affd (CA9 Cal) 524 F2d 1154.
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B. Actions to Foreclose Mortgage or Other Lien
[28 USCS § 241(KaX2)]
14. When action will lie
Action under predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410
to foreclose mortgage on realty which had been
acquired by Federal Housing Administrator
upon default of insured FHA loan secured by
mortgage on property could be maintained, as
against contention that property was really
owned by United States and hence not subject to
execution or suit. Riordan v Ferguson (1945,
CA2 NY) 147 F2d 983.
Proceeding to enforce attorney's lien for fee
was not proceeding to quiet title or for foreclosure of mortgage or other lien upon real or
personal property within contemplation of former 28 USCS §2410. Lavenburg v Universal
Sportswear, Inc. (1950, DC NY) 92 F Supp 473.
15. Effect of junior federal lien
In absence of congressional determination to
contrary, junior federal tax lien on mortgaged
property is effectively extinguished by private or
judicial sale of property in state proceedings to
which United States was not, and was not required to be, party, where under state law such
sale has effect of extinguishing junior liens even
though their holders were not, nor required to be
made, parties to proceedings. United States v
Brosnan (1960) 363 US 237, 4 L Ed 2d 1192, 80
SCt 1108.
First sentence of former 28 USCS § 2410(c),
providing that judicial sale in action involving
property to which United States claims lien shall
have same effect respecting discharge of property
from liens held by United States as may be
provided by local law of place where property is
situated, is qualified by propositions following
first sentence, among them redemption privilege
of United States; only way in which United
States, in its capacity as junior lienor, can be
joined in foreclosure proceedings was pursuant
to terms of former 28 USCS § 2410, since United
States has not otherwise waived sovereign immunity in this type of situation. United States v
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1960) 364 US
301, 5 L Ed 2d 1, 81 S Ct 1.
Second mortgage lien held by United States
may be extinguished upon foreclosure of prior
lien in accordance with Pennsylvania practice,
whereby foreclosure of prior mortgage divests all
subsequent liens on real estate and joinder of
subordinate lienors in action is not necessary and
it is not necessary to give them actual notice;
and former 28 USCS § 2410 was not intended to
require joinder of United States, but was merely
waiver of sovereign immunity by consent to be
sued in those situations where foreclosing creditor might be required to join United States as
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junior lienor under local law. United States v
Cless (1958, CA3 Pa) 254 F2d 590.
Subordinate tax hens of United States were
divested upon foreclosure of purchase money
mortgage. American Casualty Co. v Southern
Materials Co. (1958, CA4 Va) 261 F2d 197.
Action may be brought against United States
by secured creditor under 28 USCS § 2410, to
assert its senior lien against property upon which
junior federal lien has been foreclosed. Northwest Equipment Sales Co. v Western Packers,
Inc. (1976, CA9 Idaho) 543 F2d 65.
United States was not necessary party in proceedings for foreclosure of mortgage where mortgagor was in default of payments and United
States had tax lien on property junior to mortgage, and mortgagee for consideration paid, secured release of all claims of United States under
tax lien. McNally v Currigan (1956) 134 Colo
188, 301 P2d 136.
Federal tax liens filed after recording of mortgage, institution of suit to foreclose and filing of
lis pendens, were discharged so far as mortgaged
property was concerned. Puritan Dairy Products
Co. v Christoffers (1959) 54 NJ Super 102, 148
A2d 223.
16. Foreclosure sale
No decree of foreclosure could be made under
predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410(c), unless it
provided for sale of mortgaged property. Integrity Trust Co. v United States (1933, DC NJ) 3
F Supp 577.
Provisions of predecessor of 28 USCS
§ 2410(a) giving consent of United States to be
named party in any suit to foreclose mortgage or
other lien on realty, permitted relief only by sale
of property subject to lien. Ford Bros. & Co. v
Eddington Distilling Co. (1939, DC Pa) 30 F
Supp 213.
Where trial court granted defendant's motion
for strict foreclosure of mortgage on real estate
against which United States asserted tax lien,
jurisdiction over United States was lost, and, in
view of 28 USCS § 2410(c), that United States
shall be party in foreclosure proceeding only
where foreclosure by sale is sought, judgment of
strict foreclosure which purported to vest absolute title in redeeming incumbrancer was not
binding on United States. City Sav. Bank v
Lawler (1972) 163 Conn 149, 302 A2d 252.
17. Redemption, generally [28 USCS § 2410(c)]
United States, as second mortgagee of real
estate judicially foreclosed in proceeding to
which United States was made party under
former 28 USCS § 2410, was entitled to redeem,
within 1 year from date of sale pursuant to
former 28 USCS § 2410(c), despite conflicting
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state statute giving mortgagor exclusive right to
redeem within that period; inconsistent provisions of state law must fall under supremacy
clause of USCS Constitution, Art VI; redemption privilege of United States under former 28
USCS § 2410(c) was not affected by fact that
federal agency concerned is authorized by another federal statute to bid at foreclosure sale, at
least where authority of agency is not limited to
so bidding. United States v John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. (1960) 364 US 301, 5 L Ed 2d 1,
81 S Ct 1.
Provisions of 28 USCS § 2410(d) are not unconstitutional, as denying due process of law, for
failure to require hearing before government may
exercise its right of redemption under 28 USCS
§2410; in case of any real dispute involving
exercise of right of redemption, persons affected
by government's action may maintain suit under
§2410 to protect their interests. Equity Mortg.
Corp. v Loftus (1974, CA4 Va) 504 F2d 1071.
Where value of property at time of mortgage
foreclosure by bank was less than indebtedness
and bank agreed to sell property to third person,
court, in action by bank to quiet title against
subsequent tax lien of United States, ordered
such hen canceled of record where United States
had not redeemed property within 1 year, as
provided by former 28 USCS §2410. Miners
Sav. Bank v United States (1953, DC Pa) 110 F
Supp 563.
28 USCS § 2410(c), giving government right of
redemption, affects only title to mortgaged premises for one year after foreclosure sale, and
cannot be invoked by tenant seeking to continue
tenancy during that period. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v Rochester Area Council of Churches
Development, Inc. (1973) 76 Misc 2d 839, 351
NYS2d 782, affd without opinion 43 App Div 2d
905, 352 NYS2d 598.

tender full amount of prior mortgage debt,
rather than amount bid in by purchaser at
foreclosure sale; term "redeem'* as used in 28
USCS § 2410, could not be interpreted to include
only amount realized at sale, since to do so
would enable federal government, by offering
such amount, to assume position of senior lienholder, thereby gaining advantage which it could
not have secured either before or at foreclosure
sale. First Bank & Trust Co. v MacGarvie
(1956) 22 NJ 539, 126 A2d 880.
19. —Credit of lienor's account
Upon government acquiring title to property
through redemption procedure provided for by
28 USCS § 2410(c), mortgagor whose mortgage
has been foreclosed, is entitled to credit against
his account by government in amount government would have paid at foreclosure sale. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Carter (1971, CA5
Ha) 446 F2d 136, cert den 404 US 857, 30 L Ed
2d 98, 92 S Ct 104 and cert den 404 US 1000,
30 L Ed 2d 553, 92 S Ct 563.
C. Interpleader Actions [28 USCS § 2410(a)(5)]
20. Generally
When provisions of former 28 USCS § 2410
were broadened by Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966, Congress broadened government's consent
to be sued to include actions in nature of interpleader; in so doing, interpleader actions were
considered to be those suits brought by persons
holding property for purpose of determining who
is entitled to property held, which definition is in
accord with traditional definition. Johnson Service Co. v H.S. Kaiser Co. (1971, DC 111) 324 F
Supp 745.
21. When action will lie
District Court had jurisdiction of United
States in interpleader suit by 7 insurance companies wherein Collector of Internal Revenue was
made party defendant if collector was claiming
hen on proceeds of fire insurance policies for
payment of taxes of insured. United States v
Sentinel Fire Ins. Co. (1949, CA5 Miss) 178 F2d
217.
Department of Agriculture, by interpleading
with soil bank payment in action between vendee
and vendor of land, did not render itself subject
to action under 28 USCS § 2410(aX5), as interpleader was not with respect to real or personal
property on which government claimed mortgage
or other hen. Wood v Deweese (1969, DC Ky)
305 F Supp 939.
In action under predecessor of 28 USCS
§ 2410 to foreclose trust deed covering real estate
on which it was alleged federal government

18. —Payment [28 USCS § 2410(d)]
In order to redeem from sale under duly
recorded mortgage, United States, as holder of
junior tax liens, was required under former 28
USCS § 2410 to tender full amount of mortgage
debt. United States v Brosnan (1959, CA3 Pa)
264 F2d 762, affd on other grounds 363 US 237,
4 L Ed 2d 1192, 80 S C t 1108.
"The expenses necessarily incurred in connection with such property** under 28 USCS
§ 2410(dX3) include redemption expenses to prevent destruction of title, that is, expenses essential to continued vitality of junior liens. Equity
Mortg. Corp. v Loftus (1974, CA4 Va) 504 F2d
1071.
United States was required, under former 28
USCS § 2410, in seeking to make redemption
after sale of property to satisfy senior lien, to
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claimed tax lien, state court had jurisdiction as
to United States without request by trustee to
Collector of Internal Revenue. Douglas Properties v Stix (1935) 118 Fla 354, 159 So 1.
United States was proper party, under former
28 USCS § 2410, to be interpleaded in action by
supplier of materials against contractor and subcontractor to recover for materials supplied to
subcontractor, since United States had tax liens
against defendant subcontractor. Lemar Paint
Products Co. v Dimiceli (1956) 3 Misc 2d 705,
155 NYS2d 534.
Action by mortgagee of real property was not
in "interpleader or in the nature of interpleader"
within 28 USCS § 2410(aX5) where stakeholder
was insurer and not mortgagee. South Brooklyn
Sav. Bank v All State Ins. Co. (1975) 84 Misc 2d
287, 375 NYS2d 273.
D. Actions Involving Tax Liens
22. Generally
Federal tax liens are wholly creatures of federal statute, but state law governs divestiture of
federal tax liens, except to extent that Congress
may have entered field; neither 26 USCS § 7424,
dealing with civil actions to clear title to property to which federal tax lien has attached, nor
former 28 USCS §2410, disclosed intent to
exclude otherwise available state procedures
which may result in divestiture of federal tax
lien. United States v Brosnan (1960) 363 US 237,
4 L Ed 2d 1192, 80 S Ct 1108.
United States may not be sued under 28 USCS
§ 2410, where tax lien levy has been released and
is no longer outstanding. Nickerson v United
States (1975, CA1 RI) 513 F2d 31.
23. Attack on validity of lien, generally
Federal District Court had jurisdiction of action to quiet title to specific parcels of real
property owned by plaintiff brought under former 28 USCS §2410, against which United
States claimed lien for unpaid withholding, employment, and cabaret taxes of partnership in
which plaintiff was limited partner, and where
plaintiff contended that there was no lien because taxes never had been assessed against him.
Coson v United States (1958, DC Cal) 169 F
Supp 671, mod (CA9 Cal) 286 F2d 453.
Federal District Court had jurisdiction of action brought under former 28 USCS § 2410 to
expunge United States tax liens and quiet title to
real property of plaintiffs, which liens had been
assessed under jeopardy assessments against
plaintiffs as transferees. Sonitz v United States
(1963, DC NJ) 221 F Supp 762.
Upon determination in favor of taxpayer in
proceeding to cancel tax assessment, if govern-
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ment fails to cancel assessment and issue certificate of release of lien within reasonable period of
time after judgment of court becomes final and
after written request therefor by taxpayer, it
would be appropriate for taxpayer to institute
legal proceedings to force such action pursuant
to 28 USCS § 2410. Kurio v United States (1968,
DC Tex) 281 F Supp 252.
28 USCS § 2410(a) did not intend to change
traditional rule of "pay first and litigate later" as
it pertains to hens for taxes. Shaw v United
States (1970, DC Vt) 321 F Supp 1267.
In ordinary refund suit, taxpayer's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies would probably
prevent judicial review; however, such failure is
not fatal to bringing suit under 28 USCS § 2410
to challenge validity of jeopardy assessment lien
and levy procedure; under appropriate circumstances, taxpayer may clearly invoke 28 USCS
§ 2410 as available jurisdictional base upon
which to specifically challenge validity of particular government procedures and methods used
to collect tax assessment from taxpayer; however, in such action, judicial review is appropriately restricted to examining possible violations
of taxpayer's constitutional rights alleged to have
occurred during course of tax collection proceedings. YanniceUi v Nash (1973, DC NJ) 354 F
Supp 143.
24. —Determination of title against which lien
asserted
Under predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410, United
States could be made party to action against
Collector of Internal Revenue in which, in order
to grant relief sought, it was necessary to adjudge whether beneficial title to undivided interest in leases owned by plaintiff corporation ever
vested in individual taxpayer. Jones v Tower
Production Co. (1943, CA10 Okla) 138 F2d 675.
Action brought against Collector of Internal
Revenue to determine title and interest in funds
against which collector had issued warrant of
distraint, was not action to enjoin collection of
tax as contended by collector, but was action to
determine right of United States under tax lien
asserted against fund, and, United States being
necessary party, had, under predecessor of 28
USCS §2410, consented to be sued. Adler v
Nicholas (1948, CA10 Colo) 166 F2d 674.
Action to quiet title under 28 USCS § 2410(a)
will lie where delinquent taxpayer sought to
resolve title to state liquor license levied upon
and sold by United States under tax hen, so long
as taxpayer does not seek to attack validity of
assessment. Aqua Bar & Lounge, Inc. v United
States Dept. of Treasury Internal Revenue Service (1976, CA3) 539 F2d 935.
Declaratory judgment action by husband and
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wife brought under former 28 USCS § 2410 for
declaration that tax lien based on premarriage
tax lien of husband did not attach to community
property of husband and wife, could be sustained. Stone v United States (1963, DC Wash)
225 F Supp 201.
Former 28 USCS § 2410 did not provide vehicle for taxpayer to question validity of tax assessment or lien; thus, where government asserted
that given individual was taxpayer and levied
against property of that person, § 2410 could not
be construed as waiving government's immunity
in suit to question validity of that lien, even
where one bringing suit asserted that lien was on
her property, but she was not taxpayer in question. McCann v United States (1965, DC Pa)
248 F Supp 585.
25. Attack on validity of assessment
Federal government, in seeking aid of courts
in enforcing tax assessment in any form, opens
assessment to judicial scrutiny in all respects.
United States v O'Connor (CA2 NY) 291 F2d
520, 100 ALR2d 858.
Former 28 USCS § 2410 did not give government's consent to suit to quiet title by taxpayer
to test underlying merits of tax assessment, and
without such consent jurisdiction of court was
lacking. Broadwell v United States (1965, CA4
NC) 343 F2d 470, cert den 382 US 825, 15 L Ed
2d 70, 86 S Ct 57; Baits v United States (1964,
DC NC) 228 F Supp 272.
Taxpayer cannot dispute validity of tax assessment under guise of quiet title action, without
having first paid outstanding assessment; and,
even suing as marital community, husband and
wife do not become such third party as is
authorized to bring suit under 28 USCS § 2410.
Mulcahy v United States (1968, CA5 Tex) 388
F2d300.
Action to quiet title under 28 USCS § 2410(a)
will lie where delinquent taxpayer sought to
resolve title to state liquor license levied upon
and sold by United States under tax lien, so long
as taxpayer does not seek to attack validity of
assessment. Aqua Bar & Lounge, Inc. v United
States Dept. of Treasury Internal Revenue Service (1976, CA3) 539 F2d 935.
Provisions of former 28 USCS § 2410(a) did
not permit joinder of United States as defendant
in suit, primary purpose of which suit was to
ascertain tax liability. Viviano v United States
(1952, DC Mich) 105 F Supp 312; Commercial
Credit Corp. v Schwartz (1954, DC Ark) 126 F
Supp 728; Gordon v Bank of America Nat.
Trust & Sav. Asso. (1957, DC Cal) 150 F Supp
772.
Former 28 USCS §2410 did not constitute
waiver of sovereign immunity so as to permit

United States to be joined as party in action to
quiet title to property by transferee taxpayer
against whom jeopardy assessments have been
made and liens filed and to permit taxpayer to
inquire into merits of underlying assessments in
determining validity of tax lien. Cooper Agency,
Inc. v McLeod (1964, DC SC) 235 F Supp 276,
affd (CA4 SC) 348 F2d 919.
Former 28 USCS §2410 was intended to
permit United States to be joined as party in
limited class of cases; section was not intended
to grant jurisdiction over suit by taxpayer to
question amount of taxes due. Seff v Machiz
(1965, DC Md) 246 F Supp 823.
Former 28 USCS § 2410 did not provide vehicle for taxpayer to question validity of tax assessment or lien. McCann v United States (1965,
DC Pa) 248 F Supp 585.
In actions brought under 28 USCS §2410,
where tax lien is involved, sovereign immunity is
waived and subject matter jurisdiction conferred
on court, provided that plaintiff refrains from
collaterally attacking merits of government's tax
assessment itself; thus, where plaintiff questions
only legality of procedure used to enforce jeopardy assessment, and not validity of jeopardy
assessment itself, suit falls within jurisdictional
scope of 28 USCS §2410. Yannicelli v Nash
(1972, DC NJ) 354 F Supp 143.
In light of legislative history of 28 USCS
§ 2410(a), consent of government, given under
that section, does not extend to taxpayer's attack
on merits of tax assessment, through vehicle of
suit to quiet title; taxes are to be collected first,
challenges to those taxes may then be litigated,
and 28 USCS § 2410 has very curtailed function
in that it gives parties other than taxpayer,
opportunity to litigate limited set of questions
with regard to government liens on property in
which they had interest. Globe Products Corp. v
United States (1974, DC Md) 386 F Supp 319.
Annotations:
Right to attack merits of assessment, in proceeding under 26 USC § 7403 to enforce, or
under 28 USC § 2410 to discharge, federal tax
lien. 100 ALR2d 869.
26. Attack on enforcement of lien
One against whose property United States
asserts tax lien, who is not taxpayer and is thus
precluded from challenging assessment under 28
USCS § 1346(aXl), may bring action against
government under 28 USCS § 2410, if government attempts to enforce lien by levy. Busse v
United States (1976, CA7 111) 542 F2d 421.
District Court had jurisdiction to entertain,
under former 28 USCS § 2410, action to enjoin
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government from enforcing tax liens against
plaintiffs' property, where it was asserted and
disclosed to satisfaction of court, that liens were
invalid or were result of arbitrary and capricious
conduct. Sanders v Andrews (1954, DC Okla)
121 F Supp 584, revd on other grounds (CA10)
225 F2d 629, cert den 350 US 967, 100 L Ed
839, 76 S Ct 435.
Former 28 USCS §2410 was intended to
permit United States to be joined as party in
limited class of cases; section was not intended
to grant jurisdiction over suit by taxpayer to
question amount of taxes due or to enjoin enforcement of tax lien. Seff v MacHiz (1965, DC
Md) 246 F Supp 823.
27. Standing to attack
One against whose property United States
asserts tax lien, who is not taxpayer and is thus
precluded from challenging assessment under 28
USCS § 1346(aXl), may bring action against
government under 28 USCS § 2410, if government attempts to enforce lien by levy. Busse v
United States (1976, CA7 111) 542 F2d 421.
One who was not party to tax claim of United
States, although having no remedy for relief
under Internal Revenue Code, had adequate
remedy under former 28 USCS §2410 to test
validity of tax lien filed against his real property,
in any state court having jurisdiction or in any
federal court in which plaintiff could invoke
jurisdiction. Petition of Sills (1953, DC NY) 115
F Supp 239.
Taxpayer cannot dispute validity of tax assessment under guise of quiet title action, without
having first paid outstanding assessment; and,
even suing as marital community, husband and
wife do not become such third party, as is
authorized to bring suit under 28 USCS § 2410.
Mulcahy v United States (1968, CA5 Tex) 388
F2d300.
28. Resolution of conflicting tax liens
Litigation, removed at instance of United
States from state court to federal court, involving
contest between city and the United States over
priority for satisfaction of their respective tax
claims out of property seized, was cognizable by
court under provisions of former 28 USCS
§ 2410(a). New York v Evigo Corp. (1954, DC
NT) Yl\ F Supp Ito.
29. Foreclosure of state tax liens
United States cannot be party to suit to foreclose tax sales certificates without its consent.
Kenilworth v Corwine (1951, DC NJ) 96 F Supp
68.
30. Subrogation to tax lien
In action by taxpayer and her second husband
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to recover damages by reason of second husband's satisfaction of joint federal income tax
liability incurred by taxpayer and her first husband, in which plaintiffs alleged that Internal
Revenue Service had reneged on agreement that
plaintiff husband would be subrogated to right of
IRS against first husband and would acquire
thereby a tax lien on certain property, court
lacked jurisdiction under 28 USCS §2410 to
grant relief in form of determination that plaintiff husband's tax lien was superior to rights of
United States in subject property. Jorrie v Imperial Invest. Co. (1973, DC Tex) 355 F Supp
1088.
31. Tax sales
Taxpayer who alleged that his property was
advertised and sold, after levy, for payment of
back income taxes contrary to 26 USCS § 6335,
has right of action under that section, but has no
remedy for enforcing it except under 28 USCS
§ 2410(a), which waives sovereign immunity.
Little River Farms, Inc. v United States (1971,
DC Ga) 328 F Supp 476.
m . PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
32. Jurisdiction of District Court, generally
Action under predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410
to quiet title against United States and another
defendant could not be brought in federal District Court where complaint did not allege diversity of citizenship or disclose any other basis for
federal jurisdiction.
Provisions of former 28 USCS § 2410 presupposed that federal court in which suit was pending or brought had jurisdiction thereof on
grounds independent of such section; § 2410 was
not, in itself, grant of federal jurisdiction. Seattle
Asso. of Credit Men v United States (1957, CA9
Wash) 240 F2d 906; Remis v United States
(1960, CA1 Mass) 273 F2d 293; Haldeman v
United States (1950, DC Mich) 93 F Supp 889;
Tompkins v United States (1959, DC Tex) 172 F
Supp 204; Schmitz v Societe Internationale
(1966, DC Dist Col) 249 F Supp 757, cert den
387 US 908, 18 L Ed 2d 626, 87 S Ct 1684.
Provisions of former 28 USCS §2410, as
integral part of Judicial Code, established specific
jurisdiction for suits contemplated by such section, either by direct action or by removal.
United States v Morrison (1957, CA5 Tex) 247
F2d285.
Former 28 USCS §2410 waived sovereign
immunity, but did not authorize suit unless there
are jurisdictional grounds independent of that
section. Remis v United States (1960, CA1
Mass) 273 F2d 293.
Provisions of 28 USCS § 2410(aX5) do not
implicitly abandon diversity requirement in inter-
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pleader proceedings when United States is defendant; 28 USCS § 2410(aX5) presupposes valid
interpleader action, as such provision, though
waiving sovereign immunity, does not, in addition thereto, confer jurisdiction upon federal
courts. Kent v Northern California Regional
Office of American Friends Service Committee
(1974, CA9 Cal) 497 F2d 1325.
Purpose of former 28 USCS § 2410 was not to
confer jurisdiction on District Courts to entertain such cases as provided for by such section,
but rather to waive sovereign immunity of
United States in such cases where another independent ground of jurisdiction already exists.
Jones v United States (1959, DC Cal) 179 F
Supp 456.
28 USCS § 2410 is not jurisdiction-conferring
statute but is merely legislative act waiving sovereign immunity; hence, if jurisdiction is to exist,
some other statutory basis must provide it.
American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v Construcciones Weri, Inc. (1975, DC VI) 407 F Supp
164.
33. —Removal
Upon removal of action from state court, in
which action United States had been made party
pursuant to 28 USCS § 2410, and upon determination of case on its merits by federal trial court,
on appeal, Court of Appeals can consider only
whether District Court could have had original
jurisdiction of parties, and cannot consider
whether case was properly removed from the
state court. Grubbs v General Electric Credit
Corp. (1972) 405 US 699, 31 L Ed 2d 612, 92 S
Q 1344.
Upon removal from state court of action
brought under provisions of predecessor of 28
USCS § 2410, pursuant to provisions of 28 USCS
§ 1444, federal court acquired jurisdiction to
entertain action. Wells v Long (1947, CA9
Idaho) 162 F2d 842; Vincent v P. R. Matthews
Co. (1954, DC NY) 126 F Supp 102; First Nat
Bank v United States (1959, DC Tex) 172 F
Supp 757.
United States, by removing case under 28
USCS § 1444, from state court in which action
was brought under former 28 USCS § 2410, to
federal court, invokes jurisdiction of federal
court and, consequently, federal court has jurisdiction, even though it would not have had
jurisdiction if action had originally been brought
in federal court. Hood v United States (1958,
CA9 Wash) 256 F2d 522.
Where plaintiffs brought action in state court
under former 28 USCS § 2410 to quiet title to
lands upon which United States claimed reclamation project liens, and United States removed

to federal District Court, latter had jurisdiction
of action though no hen claim upon any of
several parcels of land amounted to jurisdictional
amount. Hood v United States (1958, CA9
Wash) 256 F2d 522.
Where plaintiff filed action to enforce hen
under state law in which United States was party
to proceeding, United States had no right of
removal through former 28 USCS § 2410, since
action was not to quiet title or to foreclose
mortgage or other hen upon real or personal
property. Lavenburg v Universal Sportwear, Inc.
(1950, DC NY) 92 F Supp 473.
United States was indispensable party to proceeding involving priority between city and federal tax hens, in which District Director of
Internal Revenue was served with order to show
cause why he should not be restrained from
enforcing federal hens and such tax should not
be hens vacated; hence, proceedings were removed to federal District Court. New York v
Evigo Corp. (1954, DC NY) 121 F Supp 748.
Waiver of immunity to suit granted by former
28 USCS §2410 is conditioned upon right of
removal to federal District Court provided in 28
USCS § 1444. Vincent v P. R. Matthews Co.
(1954, DC NY) 126 F Supp 102.
Removal of proceeding by United States, pursuant to 28 USCS § 1444, of state court action
brought under former 28 USCS § 2410, to appropriate federal court, is not waiver of government's objection to jurisdiction of federal court;
thus, after removal from state court, federal
court could dismiss action for want of federal
jurisdiction. Herter v Helmsley-Spear, Inc. (1957,
DC NY) 149 F Supp 713.
Although action brought under former 28
USCS §2410 had been removed from state
court, federal court had no jurisdiction to entertain such action where court would have had no
jurisdiction to entertain such action, if it had
orginally been brought in federal court. George v
United States (1960, DC Tex) 181 F Supp 522.
Waiver of immunity of United States to be
sued in state court under former 28 USCS
§ 2410 is granted upon condition prescribed in
28 USCS § 1444, which gave United States unqualified option to remove such action to federal
District Court; therefore, there is no basis upon
which District Court can remand case to state
court over objection of United States. Hamlin v
Hamlin (1964, DC Miss) 237 F Supp 299.
Interest of Federal Housing Administration as
insurer of mortgage loan, is not such interest as
would fall within purview of 28 USCS § 2410(a);
interest of United States in such situation, although difficult to define with precision, is
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clearly not "lien" under 28 USCS § 2410, and,
therefore, such action would not be subject to
removal under 28 USCS § 1444. Haggard v
Lancaster (1970, DC Miss) 320 F Supp 1252.
Jurisdiction of federal court on removal is
derivative jurisdiction, and if state court lacked
jurisdiction either of subject matter or of parties,
federal court acquires none upon removal; thus,
where action claimed by plaintiff to be in nature
of interpleader is brought against federal government under 28 USCS § 2410, and such action is
removed to federal court, court can dismiss
action as to United States where it determines
that such action is not, in fact, in nature of
interpleader. Johnson Service Co. v H.S. Kaiser
Co. (1971, DC 111) 324 F Supp 745.
Domestic action by husband against wife in
which United States is made party pursuant to
28 USCS §2410, may be removed to Federal
District Court under 28 USCS § 1444, for limited purposes of determining issues pertaining to
government's tax lien and its validity and application to certain property of parties; federal
court will not become involved in any of divorce
or domestic features of case, and, when questions
pertaining to federal government are determined,
case will be remanded to state court for further
determination of domestic features of case; if
necessary in interim, federal court may remand
any of domestic features of case which, for some
reason, may require urgent attention by state
court. Rostykus v Rostykus (1972, DC Okla)
352 F Supp 62.
Where action seeking to impress mechanic's
lien on certain residential property which was
subject to deed of trust held by Farmers Home
Administration was properly within jurisdiction
of state court under 28 USCS § 2410(a), Federal
Court had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain
action upon removal from state court under 28
USCS § 1444. E. C. Robinson Lumber Co. v
Hughes (1972, DC Mo) 355 F Supp 1363.
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requires joinder of United States as party to
foreclosure proceedings, § 2410 was mandatorily
applicable. United States v John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. (1960) 364 US 301, 5 L Ed 2d 1,
81 S Ct 1.
Under former 28 USCS § 2410, it was proper
to sue United States alone in state court. George
v United States (1960, DC Tex) 181 F Supp 522.
In order to join United States as defendant as
provided for in former 28 USCS § 2410, private
lien sought to be foreclosed must have encumbered same property that United States' hen
encumbered; thus, where mechanic's lien encumbered parcel of improved real property, and
United States' lien encumbered debt allegedly
owed by subcontractor to general contractor,
action against United States would be dismissed
for want of jurisdiction as not being within
waiver of immunity under former § 2410(a). S. &
E. Bldg. Materials Co. v Joseph P. Day, Inc.
(1960, DC NY) 188 F Supp 742.
Provisions of 28 USCS § 2410 are not mandatory, and do not require that United States be
joined as party in proceeding which could have
been brought under § 2410. Haggard v Lancaster
(1970, DC Miss) 320 F Supp 1252.
Where civil litigation involving conflicting
claims of ownership of property and receivership
was pending in state court having jurisdiction of
subject matter, and where certain parties, by
intervention duly allowed, sought foreclosure of
mortgages and loan deeds on property on which
United States claimed lien under jeopardy assessments issued by collector for unpaid income
taxes, United States may be made party thereto
under provisions of former 28 USCS § 2410.
United States v Bullard (1952) 209 Ga 426, 73
SE2d 179.

34. Pleading City Bank of Anchorage v Eaglestem (1953, DC Alaska) 110 F Supp 429.
In order to get case in group of actions to
which sovereignty is waived by former 28 USCS
§ 2410, plaintiff has to plead that action is one
for quieting of title or foreclosure and that
United States has or claims mortgage or other
lien on property. Ansonia Nat. Bank v United
States (1956, DC Conn) 147 F Supp 864.

36. Stay of proceedings
Where plaintiff wife brought action in state
court against United States to quiet title to land
conveyed to her by her husband, against claimed
tax lien against husband, which action United
States did not remove to federal District Court,
but later brought action against both husband
and wife in latter court to foreclose tax lien,
District Court, in first instance, properly stayed
further proceedings in that court pending determination of prior stale court action. Smith v
United States (1958, CA6 Ohio) 254 F2d 865.

35. Joinder
General rule that United States, by seeking
affirmative relief in state court, subjects itself to
all incidents of state law which govern other
suitors, is not applicable to proceeding which
was not initiated by United States but by private
party who joined United States pursuant to
former 28 USC §2410; and, where state law

37. Effect of judgment
Action by Internal Revenue Service to set
aside transfer of certain real property as fraudulent against government and to impress and
foreclose equitable lien on property was barred
by earlier state court quiet title action under
principles of res judicata. United States v Perry
(1973, CA5 Ala) 473 F2d 643.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at
Law § 6; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to
362.
C.J.S. — 7 CJ.S. Attorney and Client § 15;
71 CJ.S. Pleading §§ 408, 409, 411, 413.
AJLR. — Construction of phrase "usual

place of abode," or similar terms referring to
abode, residence, or domicil, as used in statutes
relating to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112.
Key Numbers. — Attorney and Client «=»
90; Pleading ** 331 to 338.

Rule 6. Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g),
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to
do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending
before it.
(d) For motions — Affidavits, A written motion, other than one which
may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1
day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some
other time.
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the
prescribed period.
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Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially identical to Rule 6, F.R.C.P.
Rules 73(a) and (g), referred to near the end
of Subdivision (b), were deleted, effective January 1, 1985. See Rules of the Utah Supreme

Legal holidays enumerated, § 63-13-2.
New trial, time of motion for, after judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, Rule 50(c)(2).
Order defined, Rule 7(b)(2)
Pleadings and other papers, service by mail,

Cross-References.— Amendment to pleadi n ^ S , conform to evidence, time of motion for,
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1? 1 15(b)
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malhn
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of n o t l c e of h e a n n

*'

75-1-401.

Commencement of action, service by mail,
Proceedings commenced may continue bevonc t m i e
Rule 3(a).
*
*° r expiration of term, § 78-7-11.
Corporation or association, mailing of proReference to master, time of first meeting of
cess to, Rule 4(e)(4).
parties after, Rule 53(d)(1).
Depositions, objections to errors and irreguRelief from judgment or order, time for molarities, Rule 32(d).
tion, Rule 60.
Discharge of attachment or release of propRules by district courts, Rule 83.
erty, Rule 64C(f).
Service by mail, Rule 5(b)(1).
Documents for state or subdivision, filing
Substitution of parties, time of motion for,
date on weekend or holiday, § 63-37-3.
£ u j e 25
Election laws Sundays included in computeS u m m o n 8 m a i l e d „ a l t e r n a t i v e to „„&
by
tion of tune § 20-1-12.
publication, Rule 4(f)(2).
Failure of term, change of time of holding r „ .
'
Y , . „„ „ „
court, process does not abate, § 78-7-10.
W , how computed § 68-3-7^
Failure of term or vacancy in office of judge,
Tribunal, board or office exceeding junsdictlon
proceeding not affected, § 78-7-21.
> noti<*> Rule 65B(e).
Jury venire, service by mail, § 78-46-13,
Undertaking by nonresident plaintiff, timely
Juvenile Court Act, time computed accord- filing, Rule 12(k).
ing to Rules of Civil Procedure, § 78-3a-27.
When a day appointed is a holiday, § 68-3-8.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Additional time after service by mail.
—Failure to add days.
Waiver of objection.
—Industrial commission.
Computation.
—Months and years.
—Sundays.
Enlargement.
—Motion for new trial.
—Notice of appeal.
Designation of record.
—Redemption from execution sales.
Motions and affidavits.
—Applicability of rule.
-Court orders.
New trial.
—Compliance with rule.
Actual notice.
Ineffective notice.
Time to prepare.
—Continuance.
Surprise.
Cited.
Additional time after service by mail.

ure to add three days to the five-day notice

-Failure to add days.
'
Waiver of objection.
Counsel waived his right to object to the fail-

J**1"* W h e r e n o ^ * £* t W ° ^ P " 1 1 ^
hearings was mailed to him, since he did not
object at the time of either hearing to the notice he received, and he showed no prejudice
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resulting from the shortened time period. In re
McCune 717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986).
—Industrial commission.
Subdivision (e) is not inconsistent nor clearly
inapplicable with the procedure of the Industrial Commission and therefore supplements
the procedure of the commission. Griffith v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 264,399 P.2d 204
(1965).
Computation.
—Months and years.
One month is a calendar month, not a lunar
month of 28 days, nor is it necessarily 30 days.
Such a month commences at beginning of day
of month in which period starts and ends at
expiration of day before same day of next
month. In re Lynch's Estate, 123 Utah 57, 254
P.2d 454 (1953).
When the time period is measured in months
or years from a certain date, the day from
which the time period is to run is excluded and
the same calendar date of the final month or
year is included. Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469
(Utah 1981).
—Sundays.
Notice of appeal was timely filed when the
last day for filing was a Sunday and the appeal
notice was filed the following day. Glad v.
Glad, 567 P.2d 160 (Utah 1977).
Enlargement.
—Motion for new trial.
Defendants' motion for new trial filed more
than ten days after entry of judgment was not
timely under Rules 52(b) or 59(b), and under
this rule trial court may not extend time for
taking any action under these rules except to
extent or under conditions stated in them; subsequent untimely appeal from denial of motion
would be dismissed on plaintiff's motion; after
original dismissal of appeal neither district
court nor Supreme Court had jurisdiction to
reinstate it. Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d
120, 466 P.2d 843 (1970).
—Notice of appeal.
Neither this rule nor Rule 60(b)(1) applies
where notice of appeal has not been filed in
time. Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277,
282 P.2d 845 (1955).
Designation of record.
Attorney who files notice of appeal is
charged with knowledge of ten-day period
within which to file designation of record on
appeal; he may file for extension of time under
this rule but may not, in the alternative, later
claim excusable neglect. Nunley v. Stan Katz
Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798
(1964).

—Redemption from execution sales.
A court, sitting in equity, may in appropriate
instances extend the period for redemption
from sales on execution. Mollerup v. Storage
Sys. Intl, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977).
Motions and affidavits.
—Applicability of rule.
Court orders.
The five-day notice of hearing provision of
Subdivision (d) does not apply to orders made
by a court, such as a show cause order. Bott v.
Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329, 437 P.2d 684 (1968).
New trial.
Provision that notice of hearing on motion be
served not later than five days before the time
specified for the hearing does not apply to motion for new trial and such notice is not integral part of motion for new trial; rule does not
change procedure whereby a motion can be
called up at any time parties desire to do so.
Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d
275 (1960).
—Compliance with rule.
Actual notice.
The trial court may dispense with technical
compliance with the five-day notice provision
of Subdivision (d) if there is satisfactory proof
that a party had actual notice and time to prepare to meet the questions raised by the motion. Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519
P.2d 236 (1974).
Ineffective notice.
Eight days' notice of trial was ineffective to
give five days' notice when notice was by mail,
since Saturday, Sunday, and three days for
mailing were to be deducted from eight-day period. Mickelson v. Shelley, 542 P.2d 740 (Utah
1975).
Time to prepare.
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by two-day notice of hearing to release property subject to
writ of attachment where he had adequate
time to prepare for hearing and defendant was
required to post cashier's check in lieu of security. Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519
P.2d 236 (1974).
—Continuance.
Surprise.
Neither plaintiff's failure to serve motion for
continuance five days before date set for hearing nor failure to file affidavits accompanying
motion justified denial of motion where plaintiffs counsel did not learn of reason for plaintiffs inability to appear at hearing in time to
make motion five days before hearing and Rule
40(b) does not expressly require affidavits to
accompany motion for continuance. Bairas v.
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962).
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63.
Key Numbers. — Courts «» 68; Motions **
10; Notice *=» 10, 11; Pleading «» 85, 199; Process «=» 63, 82.

PART III.
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS.
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; form of motions.
(a) Pleadings, There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a
counterclaim denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer
contains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an
original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party
answer, if a third-party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third-party
answer.
(b) Motions, orders and other papers.
(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion
which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing,
shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the
relief or order sought. The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the motion
is stated in a written notice of the hearing of the motion.
(2) Orders. An order includes every direction of the court including a
minute order made and entered in writing and not included in a judg21
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ingt land. Brunswick Realty Co. v. Univer- by bringing or depositing the money into court,
Co
Utah 75, 134 P 608 (1913)
yet a laintiff could waive tniB ri ht and ordi

PSfJn*- " ^

*

'

P

' W ^ ^* title
^&^Lr
tender statute referred to an action
^iSTrecovery of money only, and tender was
JSt necessary for award of costs in action to
J^^tift*' Pari**0 B°n<* * M t 8- Co. v. Beaver
'^JKmtr 97 Utah 62, 89 P.2d 476 (1939).
^&#W'
defecta#
^2hite 6 ord\narily tender had to be kept good
^

f

*>

"

narily, where he failed to bring to trial court's
attention the fact that money was not produced
in
<*>**% he did waive his right in that regard;
more especially was that true where tenderwas by check and money to meet same was at
all times in bank on which drawn. Hirsh v.
Ogden Furn. & Carpet Co., 48 Utah 434,160 P.
2 8 3 (1916)
'

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

4

Jur#
'•P^jfi*,
**"~"
^A "

20 Am Jur 2d Co8t8 §§

* *

C,J,a
"~ 20 C•J*S' Co8te § 76 et 8eq*
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^]Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental there*'••

to.

(a) Issuance of writ of execution. Process to enforce a judgment shall be
vfcyft^ ^ °^ e x e c u t i ° n unless the court otherwise directs, which may issue at
gny time within eight years after the entry of judgment, (except an execution
:
i may be stayed pursuant to Rule 62) either in the county in which such judgement was rendered, or in any county in which a transcript thereof has been
*filedand docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court. Notwithstandi n g the death of a party after judgment execution thereon may be issued, or
#fuch judgment may be enforced, as follows:
"fffrf
(1) * n c a s e °f the death of the judgment creditor, upon the application of
**£.i», his executor or administrator, or successor in interest.
*!(#-' (2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the judgment is for
;\>:
the recovery of real or personal property or the enforcement of a lien
'^> thereon.
-Jlltt (b) Contents of writ and to whom it may be directed. The writ of execu*itionmust be issued in the name of the state of Utah, sealed with the seal of
litte court and subscribed by the clerk. It may be issued to the sheriff of any
**& county in the state (and may be issued at the same time to different counties)
\ bttt where it requires the delivery of possession or sale of real property, it
^must be issued to the sheriff of the county where the property or some part
of is situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of personal
it may be issued to a constable. It must intelligibly refer to the
_ aent, stating the court, the county where the same is entered or docketed,
names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is for money, the amount
^._ reof, and the amount actually due thereon. It shall be directed to the
pNheriff of the county in which it is to be executed in cases involving real
^f^iroperty, and shall require the officer to proceed in accordance with the terms
§f|tf the writ; provided that if such writ is against the property of the judgment
||6to>tor generally it may direct the constable to satisfy the judgment, with
Iptaterest, out of the personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient personal
^ptoperty cannot be found, then the sheriff shall satisfy the judgment, with
^teterest, out of his real property.
'J&'V the judgment requires the sale of property, the writ of execution shall
S&tRdte such judgment, or the material parts thereof, and direct the officer to
247
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execute the judgment by making the sale and applying the proceeds in i
mity therewith. The judgment creditor may require a certified copy of «SS
judgment to be served with the execution upon the party against whom Ji
judgment was rendered, or upon the person or officer required thereby orlwf
law to obey the same, and obedience thereto may be enforced by the cotii-il
(c) When writ to be returned. The writ of execution shall be made r e t u ^ ^
able at any time within two months after its receipt by the officer. It shall bfcll
returned to the court from which it issued, and when it is returned the cle
must attach it to the record.
AT-**
(d) Service of the w r i t Unless the execution otherwise directs, the of
must execute the writ against the property of the judgment debtor by leM
on a sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient [property]; collectbtj^
or selling the choses in action and selling the other property, and payiiigfiS
the judgment creditor or his attorney so much of the proceeds as will s a t i n l
the judgment. Any excess in the proceeds over the judgment and a c c r u a l !
costs must be returned to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise directedS^l
the judgment or order of the court. When there is more property of the judg||l
ment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing c o ^ S
within view of the officer, he must levy only on such part of the property a|*|
the judgment debtor may indicate, if the property indicated is amply s u f f i c i n g
to satisfy the judgment and costs.
*MH
When an officer has begun to serve an execution issued out of any court o j s
or before the return day of such execution he may complete the service and
return thereof after such return day. If he shall have begun to serve an execu- 1
tion, and shall die or be incapable of completing the service and return
thereof, the same may be completed by any other officer who might by law 1
execute the same if delivered to him; and if the first officer shall not have
made a certificate of his doings, the second officer shall certify whatever he
shall find to have been done by the first, and shall add thereto a certificate of *
his own doings in completing the service.
*||

(e) Proceedings on sale of property.

« *M

(1) Notice. Before the sale of the property on execution notice thereof
must be given as follows: (1) in case of perishable property, by posting
written notice of the time and place of sale in three public places of the
precinct or city where the sale is to take place, for such a time as may be
reasonable, considering the character and condition of the property; (2}ia
case of other personal property, by posting a similar notice in at least
three public places of the precinct or city where the sale is to take place,
for not less than 7 nor more than 14 days; (3) in case of real property^ by
posting a similar notice, particularly describing the property, for 21 days,
on the property to be sold, at the place of sale, and also in at least 3 public
places of the precinct or city where the property to be sold is situated, and
publishing a copy thereof at least 3 times, once a week for 3 successive
weeks immediately preceding the sale, in some newspaper published in
the county, if there is one.
o *<
(2) Postponement. If at the time appointed for the sale of any realor
personal property on execution the officer shall deem it expedient and for
the interest of all persons concerned to postpone the sale for want of
purchasers, or other sufficient cause, he may postpone the same from time
to time, until the same shall be completed; and in every such case he shall
make public declaration thereof at the time and place previously ap«
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nointed for the sale, and if such postponement is for a longer time than
f'oD0 AW* n°ti°e thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original
^notice of such sale is required to be given.
(3) Conduct of sale* All sales of property under execution must be
^fniade at auction to the highest bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock a.m.
®* and 5 o'clock p.m. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the
^execution no more shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the execution
f*nor his deputy shall become a purchaser, or be interested in any purchase
| f at such sale. When the sale is of personal property capable of manual
delivery it must be within view of those who attend the sale, and it must
^ b e sold in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price; and when
^ the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots or parcels,
!f> they must be sold separately; or when a portion of such real property is
% claimed by a third person, and he requires it to be sold separately, such
^portion must be thus sold. All sales of real property must be made at the
I courthouse of the county in which the property, or some part thereof, is
^ situated. The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may also direct the
f£ order in which the property, real or personal, shall be sold, when such
property consists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles which can
, be sold to advantage separately, and the officer must follow such direc. tions.
\
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid shall be deemed an irrevo"^cable offer; and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for
#*e property struck off to him at a sale under execution, the officer may
again sell the property at any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss is
r occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, in addition to being liable
t on such bid, is guilty of a contempt of court and may be punished accordrt ingly- When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his discretion, thereafter reject any other bid of such person.
J*. (5) Personal property. When the purchaser of any personal property
I pays the purchase money, the officer making the sale shall deliver the
><
, property to the purchaser (if such property is capable of manual delivery)
} and shall execute and deliver to him a certificate of sale and payment.
Such certificate shall state that ail right, title and interest which the
t j ; debtor had in and to such property on the day the execution or attachment was levied, and any right, title and interest since acquired, is trans; ferred to the purchaser.
(6) Real property. Upon a sale of real property the officer shall give to
Qi
^ the purchaser a certificate of sale, containing: ( D a particular description
f of the real property sold; (2) the price paid by him for each lot or parcel if
sold separately; (3) the whole price paid; (4) a statement to the effect that
all right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor in and to the
property is conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where such sale is
i subject to redemption that fact shall be stated also. A duplicate of such
t certificate shall be filed for record by the officer in the office of the recorder of the county. The real property sold shall be subject to redemption,
except where the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a two-years' unex: pired term, in which event said sale is absolute,
(f) Redemption from sale.
(1) Who may redeem. Property sold subject to redemption, or any part
sold separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or their suc249
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cessors in interest: (1) the judgment debtor; (2) a creditor having a lieuSP
judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some share or n«Sl
thereof, subsequent to that on which the property was sold.
* ;$3||j
(2) Redemption; how made* At the time of redemption the peraSl
seeking the same may make payment of the amount required to till
person firom whom the property is being redeemed, or for him to tyf
officer who made the sale, or his successor in office. At the same time t y l
redemptioner must produce to the officer or person from whom he seeks^l
redeem, and serve with his notice to the officer: (1) a certified copy of fra?
docket of the judgment under which he claims the right to redeem, Qrtlg!
he redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the record^
thereof certified by the recorder; (2) an assignment, properly acknoitf^
edged or proved where the same is necessary to establish his claim; (3) ^Li
affidavit by himself or his agent showing the amount then actually dueec
the lien.
. r: i^
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The property may ^
redeemed from the purchaser within six months after the sale on paying
the amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon in addition, together
with the amount of any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum ft*
fire insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any im»
provements upon the property which the purchaser may have paij
thereon after the purchase, with interest on such amounts, and, if th$
purchaser is also a creditor having a lien prior to that of the person
seeking redemption, other than the judgment under which said purchase
was made, the amount of such lien, with interest.
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum demanded
for redemption is reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemption
may pay the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in diepute, to the court out of which execution or order authorizing the sale was
issued, and at the same time file with the court a petition setting forth the
item or items demanded to which he objects, together with his grounds of
objection; and thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing a time fear
hearing of such objections. A copy of the petition and order fixing time for
hearing shall be served on the purchaser not less than two days before the
day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the court shall enter an
order determining the amount required for redemption. In the event an
additional amount to that theretofore paid to the clerk is required, the
person seeking redemption shall pay to the clerk such additional amount
within 7 days. The purchaser shall forthwith execute and deliver a proper
certificate of redemption upon being paid the amount required by the
court for redemption.
(4) Subsequent redemptions. If the property is redeemed by a creditor, any other creditor having a right of redemption may, within 60 days
after the last redemption and within six months after the sale, redeem the
property from such last redemptioner in the same manner as provided in
the preceding subdivision, upon paying the sum of such last redemption,
with three percent thereon in addition and the amount of any assessment
or tax, and any reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary mainte :
nance, upkeep or repair of any improvements upon the property which
the last redemptioner may have paid thereon, with interest on such
amount, and, in addition, the amount of any lien held by such last re250
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4emptioner prior to his own, with interest. Written notice of any redemption shall be given to the officer and a duplicate filed with the recorder of
the county. Similar notice shall be given of any taxes or assessments or
any sums for fire insurance, and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair
of any improvements upon the property, paid by the person redeeming, or
the amount of any lien acquired, other than upon which the redemption
^as made. Failure to file such notice shall relieve any subsequent redemptioner of the obligation to pay such taxes, assessments, or other
liens.
, (5) Where no redemption is made. If no redemption is made within
gix months after the sale, the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a
conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever sixty days have elapsed and no
other redemption by a creditor has been made and notice thereof has been
given, the last redemptioner, or his assignee, is entitled to a sheriff's deed
a t the expiration of six months after the sale. If the judgment debtor
redeems, he must make the same payments as are required to effect a
redemption by a creditor. If the debtor redeems, the effect of the sale is
terminated and he is restored to his estate. Upon a redemption by the
debtor, the person to whom the payment is made must execute and deliver to him a certificate of redemption, duly acknowledged. Such certificate must be filed and recorded in the office of the county recorder where
the property is situated.
(6) Rents during period of redemption. The purchaser from the
time of sale until a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of his
redemption until another redemption, is entitled to receive from the tenant in possession the rents of the property sold or the value of the use and
occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits have been received by
the judgment creditor or purchaser, or his or their assigns, from the property thus sold preceding such redemption, the amounts of such rents and
profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to be paid; and if the
redemptioner or judgment debtor, before the expiration of the time allowed for such redemption, demands in writing of such purchaser or creditor, or his assigns, a written and verified statement of the amounts of
such rents and profits thus received, the period for redemption is extended five days after such sworn statement is given by such purchaser or
his assigns to such redemptioner or debtor. If such purchaser or his assigns shall for a period of one month from and after such demand, fail or
refuse to give such statement, such redemptioner or debtor may, within
sixty days after such demand, bring an action to compel an accounting
and disclosure of such rents and profits, and until fifteen days from and
after the final determination of such action the right of redemption is
extended to such redemptioner or debtor,
(g) Remedies of purchaser.
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time allowed for redemption,
the court may restrain the commission of waste on the property, upon
motion, with or without notice, of the purchaser, or his successor in interest. But it is not waste for the person in possession of the property at the
time of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards, during the period allowed for redemption, to continue to use it in the same manner in which it
was previously used, or to use it in the ordinary course of husbandry, or to
make the necessary repairs or buildings thereon or to use wood or timber
251
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on the property therefor, or for the repair of fences, or for fuel for hj^
family while he occupies the property. After his estate has become absod
lute, the purchaser or his successor in interest may maintain an action to:
recover damages for injury to the property by the tenant in possession
after sale and before possession is delivered under the conveyance.
(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain possession of property or fc
dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom. Where, because of irregifc:
larities in the proceedings concerning the sale, or because the property
sold was not subject to execution and sale, or because of the reversal or
discharge of the judgment, a purchaser of property sold on execution, b#
his successor in interest, fails to obtain the property or is dispossessed:
thereof or evicted therefrom, the court having jurisdiction thereof shallj
on motion of such party and after such notice to the judgment creditor a&
the court may prescribe, enter judgment against such judgment creditor
for the price paid by the purchaser, together with interest. In the alternative, if such purchaser or his successor in interest, fails to recover posses^
sion of any property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom ins
consequence of irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale, 6*
because the property sold was not subject to execution and sale, the court
having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of such party and after such
notice to the judgment debtor as the court may prescribe, revive the
original judgment in the name of the petitioner for the amount paid by
such purchaser at the sale, with interest thereon from the time of pay*
ment at the same rate that the original judgment bore; and the judgment
so revived shall have the same force and effect as would an original
judgment of the date of the revival.
(h) Contribution and reimbursement; how enforced. When upon an
execution against several persons more than a pro rata part of the judgment is
satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the property of one, or one of them
pays, without a sale, more than his proportion, and the right of contribution
exists, he may compel such contribution from the others; and where a judgment against several is upon an obligation of one or more as security for the
others, and the surety has paid the amount or any part thereof, by sale of
property or otherwise, he may require reimbursement from the principal. This
person entitled to contribution or reimbursement shall, within one month
after payment, or sale of his property in the event there is a sale, file in the
court where the judgment was rendered a notice of such payment and his
claim for contribution or reimbursement. Upon the filing of such notice the
clerk must make an entry thereof in the margin of the docket which shall
have the effect of a judgment against the other judgment debtors to the extent
of their liability for contribution or reimbursement.
(i) Payment of judgment by person indebted to judgment debtor. After the issuance of an execution and before its return, any person indebted to
the judgment debtor may pay to the officer the amount of his debt, or so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the execution, and the officer's receipt is
a sufficient discharge for the amount paid.
(j) Where property is claimed by third person. If an officer shall proceed
to levy any execution on any goods or chattels claimed by any person other
than the defendant, or should he be requested by the judgment creditor so to
do, such officer may require the judgment creditor to give an undertaking*
with good and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs and damages that he may
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_AIH by reason of the detention or sale of such property; and until such
^^frtaking is given, the officer may refuse to proceed against such property,
^ f ^ d e r for appearance of judgment debtor; arrest At any time
^ i n execution may issue on a judgment, the court from which an execution
^*ht issue shall, upon written motion of the judgment creditor, with or
*$hout n otice as the court may determine, issue an order requiring the judgirl
^nt debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, to appear before the court
0
master at a specified time and place to answer concerning his or its
°rot)erty. A judgment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, may be
l a i r e d to attend outside the county in which he resides, but the court may
jjtafce such order as to mileage and expenses as is just. The order may also
l e ^ a i n the judgment debtor from disposing of any nonexempt property pendw t h e hearing. Upon the hearing such proceedings may be had for the appli*~£on of the property of the judgment debtor toward the satisfaction of the
judgment as on execution against such property.
1
In aid of an order requiring the attendance of the judgment debtor, the court
•nay, upon satisfactory proof by affidavit or otherwise, that there is danger of
the debtor's absconding, order the sheriff to arrest the debtor and bring him
before the court, and may order such judgment debtor to enter into an undertaking with sufficient sureties, that he will attend from time to time before
the court or master, as may be directed during the pendency of the proceedings and until the final determination thereof, and will not in the meantime
dispose of any portion of his property not exempt from execution. In default of
entering into such undertaking, he may be committed to jail.
(1) Examination of debtor of judgment debtor. At any time when execution may issue on a judgment, upon proof by affidavit or otherwise to the
satisfaction of the court that any person or corporation has property of such
judgment debtor or is indebted to him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars,
not exempt from execution, the court may order such person or corporation or
any officer or agent thereof, to appear before the court or a master at a specified time and place to answer concerning the same. Witness fees and mileage,
if any, may be awarded by the court.
(m) Order prohibiting transfer of property. If it appears that a person
or corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment debtor or to be indebted to him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt from execution, claims an interest in the property adverse to such judgment debtor or
denies such indebtedness, the court may order such person or corporation to
refrain from transferring or otherwise disposing of such interest or debt until
such time as may reasonably be necessary for the judgment creditor to bring
an action to determine such interest or claim and prosecute the same to judgment. Such order may be modified or vacated by the court at any time upon
such terms as may be just.
(n) Witnesses. Witnesses may be required to appear and testify in any
proceedings brought under Subdivisions <kj and (1) of this rule in the same
manner as upon the trial of an issue.
(o) Order for property to be applied on judgment. The court or master
may order any property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in
the hands of such debtor, or any other person, or due to the judgment debtor,
to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment.
(p) Appointment of receiver. The court may appoint a receiver of the
property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, and may forbid
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any transfer or other disposition thereof or interference therewith until it^
further order therein provided that before any receiver shall be vested wi%
the real property of the judgment debtor a certified copy of his appointment
shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which any real:
estate sought to be affected thereby is situated.
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivision (a) of this
rule was originally taken from Rule 69(a),
F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Contempt, Chapter
32 of Title 78.
Contribution among joint tort-feasors,
§§ 78-27-39 to 78-27-43.
County recorder, Chapter 21 of Title 17.
Duty to answer questions, § 78-24-10.

Entry of a judgment after the death ofVsgi
party, Rule 58A(e).
Execution and levy against decedent or per
sonal representative prohibited, § 75-3-812/
Fee, additional filing fee for cases where execution requested, § 21-2-2.
Process in behalf of and against persons not
parties, Rule 71A.
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—Reissuance of first writ as second writ.
Contribution and reimbursement.
—Co-guarantors of installment debt.
—Joint owners.
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—Method.
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—Timeliness.
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Time of sale.
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—Amount to be paid.
Payment into court.
—Construction of rule.
—Effect.
Restoration of property to same conditionWaiver of irregularities.
—How made.
Defects in tender.
Substantial compliance.
—Timeliness.
Extension of time.
Final adjudication of rights.
—Who may redeem.
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Assignee of attorney's lien.
;*rf£j[gignee of creditor,
^ ^ a g m e n t debtor,
r i f l e s of purchaser.
- •^,-gfire

I»VICM>.

.I^JaUure to obtain possession.
'"'jfodification of judgment.
5£>bom writ directed.
ijiidicial sale.
^^^Constables.

Coat**** of writ
^IftoJaguance of first writ as second writ
A clerk may, under circumstances which
mandate his issuance of a second writ of execuS^^eissue the first writ by acknowledging
Mg initial signature thereon and using a seal
irtvidusly stamped, and by so doing, he has
LjflUed the formalities required by Subdiviftion (W that the writ be issued in the name of
ike state of Utah, sealed with the court's seal,
a«d subscribed by the clerk. Heath Tecna Corp.
^Sound Sys. Intl, 588 P.2d 169 (Utah 1978).
Contribution and reimbursement
^^Jo-guarantors of installment debt
Where plaintiff co-guarantor of installment
4*bt had paid less than half of the outstanding
balance due, his action against his co-guaranloif for contribution was premature since the
light to contribution depends upon performance by one of more than his proportionate
£are. Gardner v. Bean, 677 P.2d 1116 (Utah
1984).
—Joint owners.
Under this rule there is no authority for distinguishing between the rights of redemption
of t judgment lienholder, whose judgment was
against only one joint owner, and of a lienholder whose lien covers the entire ownership.
Tanner v. Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791
(1967).
1
Where decedent had actively participated in
purchase and furnishing of mobile home to be
Hied for the mutual benefit of himself and
plaintiff, and he and plaintiff had discussed
marriage and in fact had resided in the mobile
borne together, trial court was justified in concluding that the decedent was the joint purchaser of the home, that there was a benefit
given to him at his request, and that consequently he received consideration for becoming
• co-obligor on the purchase contract. Winkel
?. Call, 603 P.2d 808 (Utah 1979).
Enforcement of judgment
—Method.
A levy of execution is ordinarily the only
proper method to enforce a judgment lien, un-

less the case involves special circumstances,
such that execution does not lie, in which case
the procedure for enforcement is an equitable
action to foreclose the judgment lien. Belnap v.
Blain, 575 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978).
—Right of winning party.
Party in whose favor judgment was rendered
had a clear right to have it enforced, and if
anyone attempted to interfere with that right
it was also the clear duty of the court, in case a
proper application was made, to enforce the
judgment. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen,
48 Utah 214, 159 P. 541 (1916); Ketchum Coal
Co. v. District Court, 48 Utah 342, 159 P. 737,
4 A.L.R. 619 (1916).
Issuance of writ
—Partial assignment of judgment
Partial assignment of a judgment and the
execution sale held thereunder were valid
where the judgment debtor had not paid any
portion of the sizeable judgment against him
and had not been subjected to collection efforts
by the original judgment creditor; any
amounts recovered by the assignee apparently
inured to the benefit of the assignor; and there
was no claim of prejudice to the judgment
debtor resulting from the partial assignment
or from the execution sale based on the partial
assignment. Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 69 (Utah
1981).
—Stay.
Bankruptcy.
Failure to assert bankruptcy as a defense is
not fatal to a later successful assertion of a
discharge that postdates the judgment, so that
a stay of execution of the judgment is proper
based upon such discharge. Upton v. Heiselt
Constr. Co., 3 Utah 2d 170, 280 P.2d 971
(1955).
—Timeliness.
Where the judgment was rendered on October 22, 1971, and the execution sale took place
on Monday, October 22, 1979, the execution
sale was timely. Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469
(Utah 1981).
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Toffing.
Part payment or written acknowledgment °*
a judgment does not toll the eight-year limi**"
tion period for serving process to enforce a
judgment by writ- of execution. Yergensen v*
Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 696 (196^-

merit is, pursuarit \ollule ^ei), urith the next
business day. Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 2d 52: 337 P.2d 429 (1959).

Order for appearance of judgment debt^r*

Payment into court.
The intent of Subdivision (f)(3) is to allow a s
redemptioner to pay the funds into court a<$~
that the holder of the certificate of sale cannot.
clog the equity of redemption by refusing to:
cooperate in the redemption process. Granada,
Inc. v. Tanner, 712 P.2d 254 (Utah 1986%

Redemption.
—Amount to be paid.

—Issues raised.
Constitutionality.
Taxpayer who did not appeal a judgm^1*
against him for underpayment of income t a / e s
could not raise the issue of the constitution**"
ity of the tax in a supplemental proceedin8
whose purpose was to determine the locat*on
and amount of taxpayer's property for purp^86
of satisfying the judgment. State Tax Comm* vWright, 596 P.2d 634 (Utah 1979).

—Construction of rule.
.,, ^
Foreclosure is in the nature of a forfeiture*which the law does not favor, and therefore
rules and statutes dealing with redemption an^
remedial in character and should be given a
liberal construction. United States v. Loosley.
551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976).
*

Proceedings on sale of property.
—Applicability of rule.
Partition.
Sales of property in partition proceedi^8
should be governed by the statutes govern>nS
partition, and not by Subdivision (e). Gilli**or
N . QK&fiMst, SKI ^ SA m W ^ k \ m \
—Conduct of sale.

—Effect.

Separation of parcels.
Description in deed of land as "Lots 1 an^ *
of block 28, Plat A Manti City Survey" did ^ot
serve to separate an otherwise unified pat™
into two parcels subject to separate sales un^ er
Subdivision (e)(3). Commercial Bank vMadsen, 120 Utah 519, 236 P.2d 343 (19^1}Certified copy of a certificate of sale c°n~
tained in a supplemental record was suffici^nt»
on appeal, to support trial court's determi*18"
tion that a parcel of real estate was sold se?&"
rately where the record contained conflict*11^
evidence on the issue. Bawden & Assocs- vSmith, 646 P.2d 711 (Utah 1982).
Setting aside.
A sale which has been regularly held ^J"
fairly conducted should not be set aside mete*v
because a higher bid is offered later. Comitf^f"
cial Bank v. Madsen, 120 Utah 519, 236 P- 2d
343 (1951).
Time of sale.
Sheriff conducting foreclosure sale may* *n
his discretion, set such time for sale as n e
chooses so long as it is within the limit P1^"
scribed by this section. Commercial Banfc vMadsen, 120 Utah 519, 236 P.2d 343 (l&l)'
—Postponement
From Saturday or day before holiday*
When a sale which was to be held on a Sa tur "
day or the day before a holiday is postponed *°r
one day, such that additional notice is not J,ec"
essary under Subdivision (e)(2), the postp0ne"

Restoration of property to same condition.
The general effect of a redemption by the
judgment debtor or "his successor is that it re->I
stores the property to the same condition as if
no sale had been attempted. Bennion v. Amoss,
530 P.2d 810 (Utah 1975).
Waiver of irregularities.
By redeeming the property, debtor waived
and was estopped from asserting any irregularities in the foreclosure sale. Bennion v. Amoss,
530 P.2d 810 (Utah 1975).
—How made.
Defects in tender.
Where at time of tendered redemption pay-;
ment by assignee of mortgagee to purchasers"•<
at sheriffs sale no grounds for rejection were
made, subsequent claim that assignee's failure
to include copy of judgment and amount of lien
with payment was not deemed sufficient reason to reject tender. United States v. Loosley,
551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976).
Substantial compliance.
If a debtor, acting in good faith, has substantially complied with the procedural requirements of this rule in such a manner that the
lender mortgagee is not injured or adversely
sSiwhfch, ana \ s g^htig NfttfaVtifciB eiititan'uv
the law will not aid in depriving the mortgagor
of his property for mere falling short of exact
compliance with technicalities. United States
v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976).
—Timeliness.
Extension of time.
A court, sitting in equity, may in appropriate
instances extend the period for redemption
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«*]«8 on execution. Mollerup v. Storage

569 P2d 1122 aJtBh 1977)
fjf
5&
• t t j ^ a t t e r of bankruptcy after foreclosure

< ? L | « does not constitute grounds for ex^?fltar the time of redemption from sales on
* * ? 3 L Mollerup v. Storage Sys. Int'l, 569
! * ? j l 2 2 (Utah 1977).
jfasJ adjudication of rights.
here assignee of mortgagor who purchased
*LLf to institution of foreclosure was not made
l*l]Ly to the foreclosure proceedings and his
JiKg were not finally adjudicated until sev2^Bionths after foreclosure, he had six
?«ith» after such adjudication in which to ref?rtCarlquist v. Coltharp, 67 Utah 514, 248
J 4 3 I , 47 A.L.R. 765 (1926).
^ffho may redeem.
- ^ ^ g i g n e e of attorney's lien.
tjgignee of recorded attorney's lien has
ytfllt to redeem property subject to that lien
S{tt the purchaser at sheriffs sale following
flujrtgage foreclosure of the property. Downey
Sgte Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d
j « 6 (Utah 1978).
._—Assignee of creditor.
Where a grantee of the mortgagor took the
gpjgnment of a sheriffs sale certificate from a
judgment creditor in a foreclosure suit, instead
Jftaking a certificate of redemption, the assigned interest was subject to the redemption
right* of the assignee of a creditor having a
judgment lien subsequent to the foreclosure
^ T a n n e r v. Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 84, 305 P2d
882, modified on another point, 6 Utah 2d 268,
111 P.2d 791 (1957).
*>
•-—Judgment debtor.
A judgment debtor can redeem from a judg-

Rule 69

ment sale although he has parted with title
prior to the sale. Clawson v. Moesser, 535 P.2d
77 (Utah 1975).
Remedies of purchaser.
—Dispossession.
Scire facias.
Intent and purpose of statute on remedies of
dispossessed purchaser was to afford the relief
provided for by the common-law writ of scire
facias pertaining to the revival of judgments.
Continental Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. John H.
Seely & Sons Co., 94 Utah 357, 77 P.2d 355,
115 A.L.R. 543 (1938).
—Failure to obtain possession.
Modification of judgment.
Subdivision (g)(2) was not applicable where
plaintiff obtained the property but wanted a
modification of the judgment. Pitts v.
McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977).
To whom writ directed.
—Judicial sale.
Constables.
Rule 4(m) merely provides that a constable is
authorized to serve notice of an execution on a
judgment and does not constitute authority for
a constable to conduct judicial sales, which authority, pursuant to Subdivision (b) of this
rule, is specifically given to sheriffs. Larsen v.
Associates Fin. Serv. Co., 564 P.2d 1128 (Utah
1977).
Cited in Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop. v.
Bonie, 13 Utah 2d 13, 367 P.2d 860 (1962);
First of Denver Mtg. Investors v. C.N. Zundel
& Assocs., 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979).
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Rule 70, Judgment for specific acts; vesting title.
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver
deeds or other documents or to perform any other specific act and the party
fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be
done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by
the court and the act when so done has like effect as if done by the party. On
application of the party entitled to performance and upon order of the court,
the clerk shall issue a writ of attachment or sequestration against the prop*
erty of the disobedient party to compel obedience to the judgment. The court
may also in proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If real or personal
property is within the state, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof
may enter a judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in others
and such judgment has the effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.
When any order or judgment is for the delivery of possession, the party in
whose favor it is entered is entitled to a writ of execution or assistance upon
application to the clerk.
Compiler's Notes.
Rule 70, F R.C.P.

- This rule is similar to
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